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In the United States, enforcement of laws prohibiting workplace 
discrimination rests almost entirely on the shoulders of employee victims, who 
must first file charges with a government agency and then pursue litigation 
themselves. While the law forbids retaliation against employees who complain, 
this does little to prevent it, in part because employees are also responsible for 
initiating any claims of retaliation they experience as a result of their original 
discrimination claims. The burden on employees to complain—and their 
justified fear of retaliation if they do so—results in underenforcement of the law 
and a failure to spot and redress underlying structural causes of race and sex 
discrimination at work. By statutory design, government enforcement agencies 
play a crucial but limited role in litigating discrimination lawsuits, which makes 
significant expansion of the agencies’ roles politically infeasible.  
This Article considers compelled disclosure of employer information as a 
means of better enforcing antidiscrimination law. Information-forcing 
mechanisms have long been a part of securities law. The recent #MeToo and 
Time’s Up social movements have brought the power of public exposure to the 
issues of sexual harassment and pay discrimination at work. Drawing on lessons 
from both contexts, this Article argues for imposing affirmative public disclosure 
requirements on employers that track the pay, promotion, and harassment of 
employees by their sex and race. It documents emerging disclosure models in 
some state and international laws meant to target workplace discrimination and 
highlights where existing U.S. federal law opens the door to such an approach. 
It also considers counterarguments raised by compelled disclosure, including 
privacy and free speech concerns. Requiring public disclosures on equality 
measures is an incremental yet important untapped mechanism that can shift 
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some of the enforcement burden for U.S. antidiscrimination law off of employees 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, if you experience discrimination or harassment at work 
based on your sex, race, or other protected characteristic, you—the victim of 
discrimination—are responsible for enforcing the law that ensures your right to 
be free from it.1 If you complain of discrimination and your employer responds 
by taking further adverse action against you, you are then responsible for 
enforcing the law that ensures your right to be free from retaliation after 
complaining of discrimination.2 The burden of enforcing U.S. antidiscrimination 
law thus rests nearly entirely on the shoulders of employee victims.  
When Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII” 
or the “Act”)—the main federal law that prohibits employment discrimination, 
including harassment, on the basis of race, sex, and other protected 
characteristics—it created a federal enforcement agency to oversee the law, the 
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).3 But Congress 
also created a private right of action for employees, anticipating that the bulk of 
enforcement would be left to private actors.4 The EEOC works actively to 
interpret the law, educate employers, and assist the tens of thousands of 
employees who contact it each year to report discrimination.5 Its crucially 
important administrative and interpretive efforts should not be understated. Yet 
the agency has limited size and limited resources, much of which go to its 
gatekeeping function of granting employees who have filed charges the right to 
find their own lawyers and sue their employers in private lawsuits.6  
The EEOC does not monitor employer behavior or conduct inspections or 
investigations of its own accord. Aside from a small group of attorneys tasked 
with developing class or “systemic” cases in certain industries known to be the 
 
1 See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, e-5; infra Section 
I.A. 
2 Id. § 2000e-3, e-5; see also infra Section I.A. 
3 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 705, 78 Stat. 241, 258-
59 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4). 
4 Id. § 706(f). 
5 See Charge Statistics (Charges Filed with EEOC) FY 1997 Through FY 2019, EEOC, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm [https://perma.cc/7WJU-
WVUB] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020) [hereinafter Charge Statistics]; Overview, EEOC, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/overview [https://perma.cc/TN5T-VJ84] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020). 
6 What You Can Expect After You File a Charge, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/employees 
/process.cfm [https://perma.cc/4MYL-QKLC] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020). See generally 
Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a Rights-Claiming 
System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859 (2008) (cataloguing reasons that the extant private Title VII 
litigation regime fails employees who face workplace discrimination); David Freeman 
Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE L.J. 616 (2013) (critiquing EEOC’s 
current function as gatekeeper and proposing how it can reform this function to improve the 
Title VII litigation regime). 
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worst offenders,7 the EEOC learns about employers that are violating the law 
only from employees who come forward to report themselves as victims of 
discrimination or harassment, and even then it very rarely intervenes.8 Indeed, 
of the roughly 75,000 to 100,000 charges of discrimination and harassment it 
received in each of the past twenty years, the EEOC itself litigated only between 
114 and 465 cases each year—or fewer than 0.5%.9  
To those familiar with Title VII law and its enforcement mechanisms, it came 
as no surprise, then, when the #MeToo and Time’s Up movements began to 
expose pervasive sexual harassment, sexual assault, and pay discrimination 
throughout U.S. workplaces that had gone unreported and unaddressed for 
decades.10 The EEOC’s own reports cite studies estimating that at least one in 
four women (and possibly as many as 85% of women) experience sexual 
harassment at work; 75% of harassment goes unreported; and, of those who do 
complain about their harassment, 75% then experience retaliation.11 For some 
employers, a commitment to racial and gender equality leads to voluntary 
measures to prevent discrimination; for others, the fear of lawsuits provides the 
necessary motivation. But recent social movements have exposed the deep 
imperfections of a system that relies on voluntary compliance under threat of 
liability.  
Worse still, a decade of precedent under Chief Justice Roberts’s Supreme 
Court has made it more difficult for those employees who are willing to come 
forward with claims of harassment or discrimination to pursue private 
 
7 See Systemic Discrimination, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/systemic-discrimination 
[https://perma.cc/3M5Q-XA76] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020). 
8 EEOC Litigation Statistics, FY 1997 Through FY 2019, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov 
/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/litigation.cfm [https://perma.cc/82L9-Z5GP] (last visited Dec. 
28, 2020) [hereinafter Litigation Statistics]. 
9 See infra Section I.A. Compare Charge Statistics, supra note 5, with Litigation Statistics, 
supra note 8. 
10 #MeToo: A Timeline of Events, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 17, 2020, 1:52 PM), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/lifestyles/ct-me-too-timeline-20171208-htmlstory.html 
[https://perma.cc/U3LJ-Y3WD]; see also Alix Langone, #MeToo and Time’s Up Founders 
Explain the Difference Between the 2 Movements — and How They’re Alike, TIME (Mar. 22, 
2018, 5:21 PM), https://time.com/5189945/whats-the-difference-between-the-metoo-and-
times-up-movements/ [https://perma.cc/JWX2-47WH]. 
11 CHAI R. FELDBLUM & VICTORIA A. LIPNIC, U.S. EEOC, SELECT TASK FORCE ON THE 
STUDY OF HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE 8-9, 15-16 (2016) [hereinafter FELDBLUM & 
LIPNIC, HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE], https://www.eeoc.gov/sites/default/files 
/migrated_files/eeoc/task_force /harassment/report.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JE8-VLQD]; see 
also Tara Golshan, Study Finds 75 Percent of Workplace Harassment Victims Experienced 
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enforcement lawsuits when they do so.12 Court decisions on civil pleading 
standards have raised the bar for what a plaintiff must allege in their original 
complaint to survive a motion to dismiss,13 made it harder for plaintiffs to get a 
class action certified,14 and upheld mandatory predispute arbitration agreements 
that force cases out of court entirely.15 
This Article argues that the failure of U.S. law to adequately prevent and 
redress workplace discrimination and harassment is due, in large part, to an 
enforcement mechanism that is woefully out of balance, placing virtually all 
enforcement responsibility on employee victims. At the same time, it 
acknowledges that a dramatic shift toward greater public enforcement through 
increased agency-initiated investigation and litigation is politically unrealistic 
and financially infeasible. Instead, this Article proposes placing greater 
affirmative compliance responsibility on employers to show that they are taking 
active efforts to prevent harassment and discrimination in their own ranks. These 
employer efforts would be accompanied by a much smaller and less costly 
increase in public enforcement efforts: a governmental responsibility to collect, 
monitor, and publicly distribute compliance information produced by employers 
themselves.  
To develop such a proposal, this Article draws upon lessons from two distinct 
contexts: securities law and feminist social movements. First, securities law 
offers lessons on the utility of legal disclosure regimes, as well as their 
limitations. Though designed to serve a different purpose, securities laws 
provide one example of information forcing through requiring some businesses 
to publicly report data to government regulators. Second, the #MeToo and 
Time’s Up movements offer lessons on the power of publicly exposing 
harassment and discrimination as a means to influence behavior. Both securities 
law and feminist social movements provide the background upon which to 
consider the role that disclosure requirements can play in improving 
enforcement of antidiscrimination law.  
 
12 See Stephanie Bornstein, Rights in Recession: Toward Administrative 
Antidiscrimination Law, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 119, 141-53 (2014). 
13 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007) (replacing notice pleading 
standard with plausibility standard to determine whether plaintiff stated a claim to relief); 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (extending plausibility standard announced in 
Twombly to all civil actions in federal court); see also Bornstein, supra note 12, at 142-46. 
14 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 349-52 (2011) (interpreting the 
“commonality” requirement for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 
to require not just common questions of law or fact but also common answers to those 
questions); see also Bornstein, supra note 12, at 151-53. 
15 See, e.g., Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1632 (2018) (holding that 
employees may be forced to waive their right to class relief, despite the National Labor 
Relations Act’s right to “concerted activities”); Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 
U.S. 228, 238 (2013) (rejecting the “effective vindication” doctrine); see also Bornstein, 
supra note 12, at 148-51. 
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Grounded in these contexts, this Article argues for imposing affirmative 
disclosure requirements on larger employers in the areas of unequal pay by sex 
and race, lack of promotion of women and racial minorities, and sexual and 
racial harassment—referred to here as “equality disclosures.” Few legal scholars 
have considered the role of mandatory disclosures in the context of employment 
law.16 While several scholars have explored the value of pay transparency as a 
means for increasing employee negotiating power in the arena of private law,17 
this Article instead argues in favor of regulation requiring reporting to 
government enforcement agencies as a way of unleashing the additional power 
of public law.18 And while a handful of scholars have explored adding 
information on equality measures to existing securities law disclosure 
requirements governed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”),19 
this Article instead proposes adding a new disclosure regime to 
antidiscrimination law governed by the regulatory authority of the EEOC, 
arguing that the EEOC is better suited to collect this information and use it to 
enhance antidiscrimination law enforcement.20  
 
16 The notable exception is Cynthia Estlund. See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, Just the Facts: The 
Case for Workplace Transparency, 63 STAN. L. REV. 351, 357, 365-66 (2011) [hereinafter 
Estlund, Just the Facts] (making a broad theoretical case for mandatory disclosure to 
“improv[e] the efficiency of employment contracts and labor markets,” encourage 
“compliance with existing substantive mandates,” and “induc[e] 
employers . . . toward . . . good employment practices and standards of social responsibility,” 
and proposing disclosures on work hours, job safety, job security, work-life balance, waiver 
of legal rights, and workforce demographics); Cynthia Estlund, Extending the Case for 
Workplace Transparency to Information About Pay, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 781 (2014) 
[hereinafter Estlund, Extending the Case] (applying her general theory to pay disclosures); 
see also ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM & DAVID WEIL, FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND 
PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY 35-49 (2007); RALPH NADER, MARK GREEN & JOEL SELIGMAN, 
TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 132-79 (1976); Charlotte S. Alexander, Transparency and 
Transmission: Theorizing Information’s Role in Regulatory and Market Responses to 
Workplace Problems, 48 CONN. L. REV. 177, 179-205 (2015). 
17 See, e.g., Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Money, Sex, and Sunshine: A Market-Based 
Approach to Pay Discrimination, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 951, 1001-15 (2011); Estlund, Extending 
the Case, supra note 16, at 783; Orly Lobel, Knowledge Pays: Reversing Information Flows 
and the Future of Pay Equity, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 547, 567-87 (2020); Gowri Ramachandran, 
Pay Transparency, 116 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1043, 1059-62 (2012). For a discussion of 
transparency around workforce diversity initiatives, see Jamillah Bowman Williams, 
Diversity as a Trade Secret, 107 GEO. L.J. 1685, 1723-30 (2019). 
18 See infra Section II.C.2. 
19 See, e.g., NADER, GREEN & SELIGMAN, supra note 16; Daniel Hemel & Dorothy S. Lund, 
Sexual Harassment and Corporate Law, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1583 (2018); Elizabeth A. 
Aronson, Note, The First Amendment and Regulatory Responses to Workplace Sexual 
Misconduct: Clarifying the Treatment of Compelled Disclosure Regimes, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1201 (2018). 
20 See infra Section III.C.2. 
 
294 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101:287 
 
This Article looks to examples from antidiscrimination reporting 
requirements recently enacted in other high-income21 countries and several U.S. 
states and then builds upon the limited data already collected in some areas of 
federal antidiscrimination law. Part I describes the current system of civil 
enforcement for discrimination and harassment claims under U.S. law and any 
retaliation that results from the original complaints. It identifies the severe gaps 
that currently exist in this system and highlights the impending crisis in access 
to private enforcement due to recent Supreme Court procedural jurisprudence. 
Part II provides the justification for imposing affirmative reporting requirements 
on employers as a means of antidiscrimination law enforcement. It draws lessons 
on information forcing from disclosure requirements in the securities-law 
context and lessons on the power of public exposure from the #MeToo and 
Time’s Up movements. This Part then explains the role that disclosure 
requirements can play in antidiscrimination law, helping shift from reactive to 
proactive efforts, from secrecy to accountability, and from gatekeeping to more 
robust enforcing. Part III turns to specific mechanisms for forcing disclosure by 
employers, looking to legal models in European and other high-income countries 
and models recently enacted in several U.S. states. It then builds upon the limited 
data collection efforts already in place in other areas of federal 
antidiscrimination law to provide a path forward. Part IV concludes by 
considering counterarguments against disclosure requirements, including 
questions about their effectiveness, privacy concerns, and potential First 
Amendment implications as compelled speech.  
Ultimately, this Article argues that imposing affirmative public reporting 
requirements on employers around equality measures is a justifiable, 
incremental, and necessary step to shift the burden of antidiscrimination law 
enforcement off of employee victims alone and more equally onto responsible 
institutions to reach persistent problems of workplace inequality. 
I. THE LIMITATIONS OF ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
This Part explains the current process for enforcing U.S. antidiscrimination 
law, including protections against retaliation for reporting violations. Because 
enforcement relies nearly entirely on private lawsuits brought by employees who 
fear retaliation if they complain, only a fraction of discrimination and 
harassment claims are ever pursued, leaving significant gaps in enforcement. For 
those who are willing to complain, the past decade and a half of Supreme Court 
procedural jurisprudence has made it more difficult to pursue private lawsuits, 
 
21 The term “high-income countries” comes from World Bank classifications defining 
“high-income economies [as] those with a [gross national income] per capita of $12,536 or 
more.” World Bank Country and Lending Groups, WORLD BANK: DATA, 
https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519 [https://perma.cc/66HZ-
ZAZE] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020). 
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exacerbating the problem of underenforcement. As this Part documents, the 
burden of enforcing Title VII falls disproportionately on discrimination victims 
themselves—those with the least power and resources to prevent and redress 
discrimination. 
A. The Process for Enforcing U.S. Antidiscrimination Law 
Under federal antidiscrimination law and its state law equivalents, employees 
are primarily responsible for recognizing, reporting, and pursuing discrimination 
and harassment complaints. By congressional design, Title VII has a hybrid 
enforcement system in which the statute is enforced by both a public agency, the 
federal EEOC, and by private plaintiffs, who may pursue their own private rights 
of action.22 Yet the burden of this hybrid system is not equally shared; the EEOC 
plays a vitally important but very limited role in enforcement litigation.23 And 
virtually no enforcement can happen without an employee who is willing to 
speak up and file a complaint against their employer.24  
On the public side of the hybrid enforcement system, the EEOC has a small 
unit of systemic litigators that seek out, develop, and pursue law-reform 
litigation.25 They devote their limited resources to a small proportion of cases 
that need them the most: those that set new precedent, affect significant 
employers, or target particular industries in which workers are unlikely to be 
able to find private representation.26 In extremely rare circumstances, the EEOC 
may choose to intervene and agree to represent an employee based on a filed 
charge.27 Yet the primary role of EEOC enforcement is to pursue those cases 
that the agency itself deems a priority and develops.28 The cases the EEOC does 
choose to pursue are often designed for maximum impact with limited resources 
by creating visible examples of advancement in the law or seeking results against 
the largest employers.29 But while their impact may be important, the miniscule 
number of enforcement actions pursued by the EEOC30 leaves most employees 
on their own to pursue their claims through private litigation. 
 
22 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 to -5. 
23 See Bornstein, supra note 12, at 126-41. 
24 Filing a Charge of Discrimination, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/employees 
/charge.cfm [https://perma.cc/S3J2-RLRY] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020); Filing a Lawsuit, 
EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/lawsuit.cfm [https://perma.cc/2B9T-F7N5] (last 
visited Dec. 28, 2020). 
25 See Systemic Discrimination, supra note 7. 
26 Litigation Procedures, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/litigation-procedures 
[https://perma.cc/Y2HR-GUUJ] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020). 
27 See Bornstein, supra note 12, at 130 (illustrating “small number of cases” where EEOC 
initiates litigation “from a plaintiff’s charges filed with the agency”). 
28 See id. (explaining that EEOC litigation also results from “agency’s own investigation 
and enforcement priorities”). 
29 See Litigation Procedures, supra note 26. 
30 See Litigation Statistics, supra note 8. 
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Comparing the number of antidiscrimination lawsuits pursued by the EEOC 
to the number pursued privately paints a stark picture. In each one of the last 
twenty-two years, the EEOC has received between 72,675 and 99,947 charges 
of discrimination on the basis of sex, race, or another protected class.31 In each 
one of those years, the EEOC filed only between 114 and 465 lawsuits—
meaning they represented between 0.1% and 0.6% of all charge filers.32 The 
agency resolved another 5% to 15% of charges each year through settlements or 
conciliation.33 That leaves the remainder of the enforcement—for at least 85% 
and up to 95% of all charge filers to the EEOC—to the filers’ own devices to 
obtain private representation. Indeed, in the past decade, private attorneys filed 
between 13,000 and 22,000 employment discrimination lawsuits in federal 
courts annually—roughly forty to sixty-five times as many cases as the EEOC;34 
likely thousands more were filed in state courts. 
Moreover, every single charge filed began with an employee who was willing 
and able to file a complaint. An employee must first understand that what 
happened to them at work constituted protected-class discrimination or 
harassment—a challenge given that a mere 10.3% of the U.S. workforce (and 
only 6.2% of the private-sector workforce) is represented by a union that might 
provide legal information.35 The employee must then decide that they are willing 
to take the risk of complaining, despite fear of retaliation or potential costs to 
their personal and professional lives.36 If so, they must figure out how to file a 
charge of discrimination or harassment with the federal EEOC or state 
equivalent within either 180 or 300 days from the adverse employment action.37 
In the vast majority of cases, after an agency investigation, the EEOC will issue 
the employee a “right to sue letter,” which gives the employee the right to find 
a private plaintiff’s attorney willing to take their case on a contingency fee or 
 
31 Charge Statistics, supra note 5. 
32 Litigation Statistics, supra note 8. 
33 All Statutes (Charges Filed with EEOC) FY 1997 - FY 2019, EEOC, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/all.cfm [https://perma.cc/4BAM-DK6J] 
(last visited Dec. 28, 2020). 
34 See Bornstein, supra note 12, at 130. 
35 Press Release, Bureau of Lab. Stat., Union Members — 2019, at 5 tbl.1, 7 tbl.3 (Jan. 22, 
2020), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf [https://perma.cc/8RFH-MK3T]. 
36 See infra Section I.B. 
37 At the state level, the enforcement mechanisms largely mirror those of the federal law. 
All but three states—Alabama, Arkansas, and Mississippi—have their own state fair-
employment-practice agencies that accept complaints and conduct investigations. 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1601.74 (2020) (listing state and local fair-employment-practice agencies); see also Fair 
Employment Practice Agencies (FEPAs) and Dual Filing, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/fair-
employment-practices-agencies-fepas-and-dual-filing [https://perma.cc/2Q9Y-TNNA] (last 
visited Dec. 28, 2020); Time Limits for Filing a Charge, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/time-
limits-filing-charge [https://perma.cc/55QC-UE6C] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020). 
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for the prospect of attorneys’ fees, despite the low success rate of plaintiffs in 
employment discrimination lawsuits.38 
There is no doubt, then, that the EEOC and state agencies play a critically 
important role in issuing regulations and pursuing the hundreds of systemic or 
law-reform cases they pursue each year. Yet without employees’ willingness to 
publicly pursue actions against their employers, private businesses are rarely, if 
ever, held accountable for any discrimination or harassment that occurs in their 
midst. 
B. Retaliation Protections 
To encourage employees to pursue discrimination and harassment 
complaints, Title VII prohibits retaliation against any employee for complaining 
or participating in another employee’s complaint.39 Yet this does not stop 
retaliation from occurring, further undermining the strength of existing 
antidiscrimination law enforcement. 
Under Title VII, it is unlawful to take an adverse action against an employee 
“because he has opposed any practice” unlawful under the Act or “made a 
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, 
proceeding, or hearing” under the Act.40 The Supreme Court has interpreted 
protections against retaliation more broadly than those against discrimination to 
encourage employees to help enforce Title VII.41 The Court held that, while 
discrimination is only actionable where it results in an “adverse employment 
action” at work—for example, a denial of promotion or something that impacts 
pay—retaliation is actionable when it results in any “materially adverse” action 
that would “dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge 
of discrimination.”42 This may include actions taken outside of work43 or actions 
taken against a very close third party (like the original complainant’s fiancé) 
meant to punish the complainant.44 Yet the Court has also placed limitations on 
this breadth, holding that retaliation must be the but-for cause of the materially 
adverse action45 and limiting the reach of protections to require a “reasonable, 
good faith belief” that the underlying action violated the law when the employee 
complains internally (rather than to a state or federal agency).46 
 
38 See What You Can Expect After You File a Charge, supra note 6. 
39 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
40 Id. 
41 See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006). 
42 Id. at 57. 
43 Id. at 57, 64. 
44 See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 175 (2011). 
45 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 362-63 (2013). 
46 Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270 (2001) (per curiam) (quoting 
Breeden v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 99-15522, 2000 WL 991821, at *1 (9th Cir. July 19, 
2000)). 
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The fact that retaliation is also prohibited under Title VII has not stopped 
employers from retaliating. Indeed, over the past two decades, the number of 
retaliation charges filed with the EEOC has steadily increased nearly every 
year.47 In 1997, a claim of retaliation was filed in 22% of charges filed with the 
EEOC; by 2019, that number had more than doubled to 53.8%, meaning that 
more than half of those who filed a discrimination or harassment charge in 2019 
also experienced retaliation for doing so.48 Of course, the cause of the increase 
in retaliation charges is not clear; it could either be due to an increase in the 
incidence of retaliation or in the knowledge of the issue and the ability to add it 
to one’s underlying discrimination charge. Regardless, it is safe to say that 
retaliation is not occurring less often than in the past, despite increased 
awareness of the problem. 
Legal scholars attribute the persistence of retaliation despite its legal 
proscription to a number of causes. As Deborah Brake has noted, retaliation is 
so difficult to root out because it “performs important work in institutions,” 
helping to “suppress challenges to perceived inequality.”49 Employees engage 
in a cost-benefit analysis before complaining of discrimination and often 
perceive reporting “to entail high costs,” including “[f]ear of provoking 
retaliation.”50 As Nicole Porter has explained, the seemingly broad standards 
created by the Supreme Court are actually more difficult to meet than they 
seem.51 In particular, Sandra Sperino has documented how lower courts have 
applied precedent narrowly, excluding many consequences that employees fear 
(for example, reprimands, schedule or assignment changes, or ostracism) from 
the definition of “materially adverse” action required to trigger antiretaliation 
protections.52 
In the end, enforcement of Title VII’s antiretaliation protections suffers from 
the same limitations as enforcement of its discrimination and harassment 
protections. Any retaliation that occurs after a complaint of discrimination can 
only be redressed in the same way as the underlying discrimination—by an 
employee willing to file a charge with the EEOC and, almost always, able to 
find a plaintiff’s attorney to represent them in a private lawsuit.53 Given that now 
more than half of those willing to file a discrimination charge with the EEOC 
 
47 Charge Statistics, supra note 5. 
48 Id. 
49 Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 36, 37-39 (2005). 
50 Id. at 37. 
51 Nicole Buonocore Porter, Ending Harassment by Starting with Retaliation, 71 STAN. L. 
REV. ONLINE 49, 54-55 (2018); see also Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation in an EEO World, 89 
IND. L.J. 115, 135-64 (2014). 
52 Sandra F. Sperino, Retaliation and the Reasonable Person, 67 FLA. L. REV. 2031, 2041-
42 (2015); see also Porter, supra note 51, at 55, 57. 
53 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3. 
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also experience retaliation, employees’ fears that they will be penalized for 
complaining are not just warranted but are, in fact, rational.  
C. Enforcement Gaps and Diminishing Access to Courts 
Under the existing hybrid enforcement system for Title VII, private plaintiffs’ 
lawsuits account for the vast majority of enforcement actions, and justifiable fear 
of retaliation impedes employees from complaining. This reality leads to two 
troubling implications. First, there is a significant gap between the prevalence of 
discrimination, harassment, and retaliation in the workplace and the frequency 
with which they are reported and successfully redressed. For example, studies 
estimate that between 25% and 85% of women are sexually harassed at work,54 
and approximately 70% of those who experience harassment do not report it.55 
This is not surprising given that 75% of those who do complain report then 
experiencing retaliation for their complaint.56 
Second, to the extent that Title VII relies on private litigation for enforcement, 
any deterrent effects are now hampered by a jurisprudential trend toward 
limiting private access to the courts. While private litigation was a cornerstone 
of Title VII enforcement for the first four decades after its enactment in 1964, 
“litigation reform” efforts and procedural decisions in the past two decades pose 
a threat to its efficacy. Since the early 2000s, and particularly under Chief Justice 
Roberts’s Supreme Court, a series of decisions on arbitration agreements and 
class actions stands to limit enforcement goals.57 A full analysis of the vast body 
of scholarship documenting this trend is outside the scope of this Article,58 but 
two developments bear mentioning.  
On class actions, Supreme Court precedent reining in class certification, 
including the 2011 decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,59 has made it 
harder and more costly for plaintiff’s attorneys to pursue class actions on behalf 
of victims of discrimination.60 This means that employees—particularly those 
who earn lower wages—are less likely to be able to find representation. On 
arbitration agreements, a series of cases upheld the enforceability of mandatory 
 
54 FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 11, at 8. 
55 Id. at 15-16; see also Golshan, supra note 11. 
56 FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 11, at 16; see also 
Golshan, supra note 11. 
57 See Stephanie Bornstein, Public-Private Co-Enforcement Litigation, 104 MINN. L. REV. 
811, 845-46 (2019); Bornstein, supra note 12, at 141. 
58 See Bornstein, supra note 12, at 142-54 (citing scholarship and analyzing the impact of 
intensified pleading standards, increased mandatory individual arbitration, and limited class 
action employment discrimination claims on civil lawsuits). 
59 564 U.S. 338 (2011). 
60 Id. at 359-60 (rejecting class certification under Rule 23(a)(2), concluding that plaintiffs 
could not demonstrate commonality without definitive evidence of “companywide 
discriminatory pay and promotion,” and rejecting claims for backpay under Rule 23(b)(2) 
because “monetary relief [was] not incidental to the injunctive or declaratory relief”). 
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predispute arbitration agreements that force employees out of the courtroom,61 
culminating in 2018’s Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis,62 in which the Court upheld 
even arbitration agreements that waive any and all class claims, forcing 
employees into individual arbitration.63 Data shows that mandatory arbitration 
agreements that include class action waivers are on the rise. One study estimated 
that in 2018, 56.2% of the nonunionized, private-sector workforce was covered 
by arbitration agreements, nearly one-third of which barred class actions.64 
As a result of these trends, not only will fewer antidiscrimination cases be 
litigated by private attorneys but also those that are pursued may be forced into 
arbitration and largely shielded from public view, weakening their signaling 
power to deter other violations and strengthen compliance. 
II. THE CASE FOR DISCLOSURE AS A MEANS OF ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
This Part provides the theoretical basis for moving beyond existing U.S. 
enforcement mechanisms to require businesses to affirmatively produce 
information on their own compliance with antidiscrimination law. Information-
forcing mechanisms have been a required part of federal securities law for 
decades, offering one example of the benefits and limitations of a disclosure 
regime. More recently, the #MeToo and Time’s Up movements have 
demonstrated the power of public exposure of harassment and discrimination 
complaints, suggesting a need for greater transparency in workplace equality 
measures. Both contexts provide rationales for imposing mandatory public 
disclosure requirements as part of antidiscrimination law enforcement. Drawing 
on these examples, this Part argues that compelled disclosure can improve 
antidiscrimination law enforcement by increasing prevention ex ante, fostering 
employer accountability, and expanding the government enforcement role 
beyond gatekeeping for private lawsuits.  
A. The Lessons of Disclosure from Securities Law 
For nearly a century, securities law has imposed mandatory disclosure 
requirements on companies. Federal securities regulation began in the wake of 
the Great Depression to serve the “national public interest” of restoring investor 
faith in the stock market by protecting investors to, in turn, spark growth.65 To 
curb the speculation and unchecked promises that had led to the 1929 stock 
 
61 See Bornstein, supra note 57, at 845-46; Bornstein, supra note 12, at 141. 
62 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018). 
63 Id. at 1622-23 (enforcing arbitration agreement that waived employee’s right to pursue 
class claims despite the National Labor Relations Act’s protection of “concerted activity”). 
64 ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, ECON. POL’Y INST., THE GROWING USE OF MANDATORY 
ARBITRATION 2 (2018), https://files.epi.org/pdf/144131.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2YL-JVAS]. 
65 Hillary A. Sale, Disclosure’s Purpose, 107 GEO. L.J. 1045, 1047-48 (2019) (quoting 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(b)). 
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market crash, Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.66 The Acts created the SEC as the federal regulatory 
agency overseeing federal securities law and required periodic disclosures.67 
Both Acts required companies that sell public securities like stocks and bonds to 
provide “truthful information” on the risks associated with investing, creating a 
national disclosure regime.68  
As it applies today, securities law requires disclosure of key information 
reported up front at the company’s initial stock issuance and updated at regular 
intervals. These disclosures are supported by an antifraud rule that requires that 
the information disclosed is accurate and without material omissions.69 
Disclosure requirements apply to certain covered entities—according to a recent 
estimate, about 3,700 companies today.70 While the range of entities that must 
comply with federal periodic disclosure requirements has evolved over time,71 
the law today covers “all firms with securities traded on a national exchange,” 
“most firms . . . once they execute[] a public securities offering,” and all firms 
with over $10 million in assets and 2,000 shareholders.72 
Federal securities law requires covered entities to make both public and 
nonpublic disclosures to the SEC.73 To issue securities available for purchase by 
the public, companies are required to publicly disclose information material to 
the stock value, “including financial statements, business risks and prospects, a 
 
66 See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a; 15 U.S.C. § 78a. 
67 See 15 U.S.C. § 78(d); see also Michael D. Guttentag, Patching a Hole in the JOBS Act: 
How and Why to Rewrite the Rules that Require Firms to Make Periodic Disclosures, 88 IND. 
L.J. 151, 163-164 (2013); What We Do, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo 
.html#create [https://perma.cc/TPG7-TWQJ ] (last updated Dec. 18, 2020). 
68 See EVA SU, CONG. RSCH. SERV., SECURITIES DISCLOSURE: BACKGROUND AND POLICY 
ISSUES 1 (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IF11256.pdf [https://perma.cc/KD9R-YR5D]. 
69 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2020); see also Sale, supra note 65, at 1048 (“The investor 
protection goal is met on the front end with disclosure requirements that address required 
disclosures and omissions.”). 
70 Editorial Board, Where Have All the Public Companies Gone?, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 9, 
2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-04-09/where-have-all-
the-u-s-public-companies-gone. 
71 See Guttentag, supra note 67, at 164-71 (describing changes to what entities must 
comply with disclosure requirements enacted through additional legislation passed in 1936, 
1964, 1999, and 2012). 
72 Id. at 152-53, 164, 169 n.98 (citing Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 
112-106, § 601, 126 Stat. 306, 326 (2012) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(1)(B)); 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.12g-1 (2020)) (discussing how, in 2012, the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act raised 
threshold shareholder level to 2000 shareholders “so long as at least fifteen hundred . . . are 
accredited investors” excluding “employees who received shares through a distribution 
exempt from public offering requirements”); Exchange Act Reporting and Registration, SEC, 
https://www.sec.gov/smallbusiness/goingpublic/exchangeactreporting 
[https://perma.cc/H8TV-MYQ8] (last updated Oct. 24, 2018) (explaining which firms are 
required to comply with disclosure requirements). 
73 See SU, supra note 68, at 1-2. 
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description of the stock to be offered for sale, and the management team and 
their compensation.”74 Public disclosures are accessible to the public through 
the SEC’s EDGAR online database.75 Covered entities must also provide 
nonpublic disclosures to the SEC to allow the agency to monitor additional 
issues, with the option to “release certain information in the aggregate [or] use 
the information in enforcement actions.”76 When entities fail to comply with 
disclosure requirements or to do so honestly, the SEC can enforce the law 
through litigation seeking civil and criminal penalties.77  
Notably, the disclosure of correct information is the only goal of the 
disclosure regime; investors are left to make their own choices about an 
investment’s risk or worthiness using that information.78 And while, in the past, 
disclosure requirements focused on individual consumer investors, the 
disclosure regime is largely now understood by scholars to provide information 
to more sophisticated “information traders,” with the goal of efficiency in 
financial markets and the economy overall.79 
The system of securities disclosure requirements is not without its critics. It 
has “detractors and counterarguments” and has been subject to “calls for changes 
and overhauls.”80 Some commentators argue that existing regulations are either 
not effective enough to be worth their cost81 or not rigorous enough to prevent 
 
74 Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o(d). 
75 See About EDGAR, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/edgar/about [https://perma.cc/W9DY-
T4W5] (last updated Aug. 24, 2020). 
76 See SU, supra note 68, at 1-2. 
77 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(b), (d)(1); What We Do, supra note 67. 
78 See Sale, supra note 65, at 1048-49 (“Indeed, the regulatory choice was to provide 
investors with accurate information, not to develop a regime where regulators determined the 
merits of the securities or entity.”). 
79 Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchamovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 
55 DUKE L.J. 711, 713-14 (2006). 
80 Sale, supra note 65, at 1051 (citing John C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: 
Contingent Capital and the Need for Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM. 
L. REV. 795 (2011); Paul G. Mahoney, Technology, Property Rights in Information, and 
Securities Regulation, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 815 (1997); and Adam C. Pritchard, Self-Regulation 
and Securities Markets, REG., Spring 2003, at 32); see also infra Part IV. 
81 For example, after eight years of fighting over how to implement the Dodd-Frank pay-
ratio rule (Section 953(b)), and related SEC regulations on executive compensation and 
compensation ratios between the CEO and median employee, early evidence showed that data 
was hard to compare and had little impact on investment recommendations or limitations on 
CEO pay. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 953, 124 Stat. 1376, 1903-04 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(i)); SU, supra 
note 68, at 2 (noting that SEC studies costs and benefits of 10-Q quarterly reporting); Peter 
Eavis, The Highest-Paid Executives Keep Getting Richer, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2019, at BU4; 
Deb Lifshey, The CEO Pay Ratio: Data and Perspectives from the 2018 Proxy Season, HARV. 
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market failures.82 Others argue that they are too investor oriented and propose 
greater expansion of disclosures requirements to cover environmental, social, 
and governance issues (“ESG”), such as environmental sustainability, political 
activities, consumer protections, and labor relations.83 Countercriticism of ESG-
oriented disclosure expansion suggests that it is driven by special interest groups 
with limited appeal to investors and limited relevance to the original purpose of 
disclosures.84 Nevertheless, as Hillary Sale argues, the securities disclosure 
regime provides enough utility in its primary objectives to reduce fraud and 
stabilize the market and, despite its critics, “the system has remained firmly in 
place.”85  
Setting aside possible criticisms for the moment,86 this Section details the 
main benefits of classic, traditional financial disclosure regimes as a point of 
comparison for adopting disclosure in the separate regulatory scheme of 
antidiscrimination law. The goal of required securities disclosures is not to 
change corporate behavior. As such, it offers limited direct applicability to an 
antidiscrimination regime. Yet, as part of a more comprehensive enforcement 
scheme, some scholars of financial disclosure law identify several features that 
may apply to imposing disclosure requirements in other contexts: (1) correcting 
“information asymmetries,” (2) affecting the behavior of those responsible for 
reporting, and (3) the impact of “publicness.”87  
1. Correcting Information Asymmetry 
The defining feature of securities disclosure requirements is that they provide 
a level playing field by correcting information asymmetry between those inside 
the company who know about the inner workings of the company and those 
 
82 Sale, supra note 65, at 1051 n.47. 
83 See Ann M. Lipton, Mixed Company: The Audience for Sustainability Disclosures, 107 
GEO L.J. ONLINE 81, 82-86 (2018) [hereinafter Lipton, Mixed Company]; Ann M. Lipton, Not 
Everything Is About Investors: The Case for Mandatory Stakeholder Disclosure, 37 YALE J. 
REG. 499, 501-04, 561-72 (2020) [hereinafter Lipton, Not Everything]; see also Jennifer S. 
Fan, Regulating Unicorns: Disclosure and the New Private Economy, 57 B.C. L. REV. 583, 
609 (2016); Hemel & Lund, supra note 19, at 1669-70; Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities 
and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 
1289 (1999). 
84 One example is what is known as the “conflict minerals rule.” Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, § 1502, 124 Stat. 1376, 2213 (2010) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)) (requiring disclosures about conflict materials 
in or near Democratic Republic of the Congo). For more on criticism of this rule, see Hemel 
& Lund, supra note 19, at 1668; David M. Lynn, The Dodd-Frank Act’s Specialized 
Corporate Disclosure: Using the Securities Laws to Address Public Policy Issues, 6 J. BUS. 
& TECH. L. 327, 330-31 (2011). 
85 Sale, supra note 65, at 1051. 
86 For discussion of and responses to these criticisms, see infra Sections III.B-C, IV.A. 
87 See, e.g., Sale, supra note 65, at 1049-51; Lipton, Not Everything, supra note 83, at 519-
26; see also infra Section IV.A. 
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outside either buying stock or impacted by the sale of its stock.88 The law aims 
to protect investors and the efficiency of the market by providing information 
important to investor decision-making that investors would otherwise lack.89 
Placing the requirement to disclose this information on the companies 
themselves is efficient; without it, countless investors and advisors would 
duplicate efforts to search for the information they need to make informed 
decisions—information that it is less costly for the firm itself to provide.90  
Having a disclosure regime that requires information to be produced 
according to set guidelines also ensures that the information produced and 
published is standardized, which makes the information more useful for 
comparisons. Investors, advisors, and the public can then compare investment 
opportunities and risks.91 Because disclosed information is standardized and 
made public, companies can also compare themselves to competitors, which 
may motivate them to consider how they look “relative to [their] peers.”92  
An analogous problem of information asymmetry occurs between employees 
or applicants and employers, supporting the concept of creating affirmative 
disclosure requirements in the context of antidiscrimination law. Employment 
law scholars have long studied how employees’ lack of information negatively 
affects their ability to bargain individually for protections related to job 
security.93 More specifically, a lack of information about pay structures and what 
other employees are paid has posed a particular problem that has contributed to 
the racial and gender pay gaps.94 Indeed, employers often discourage their 
 
88 Sale, supra note 65, at 1045-46. 
89 See Hemel & Lund, supra note 19, at 1667-70; Sale, supra note 65, at 1047-50. 
90 See Goshen & Parchamovsky, supra note 79, at 738 (“Mandatory disclosure duties 
reduce the cost of searching for information. Absent mandatory disclosure duties, information 
traders would engage in duplicative efforts to uncover nonpublic information. The cost of 
these efforts would be extremely high because information traders, as outsiders, lack access 
to the management of the firm. Disclosure duties pass these costs to the individual firm. For 
the firm, the cost of obtaining firm-specific information is rather minimal; indeed, it is a mere 
by-product of managing the firm.” (footnote omitted)). 
91 See id. (noting that “securities regulation mandates a specific format for disclosure, 
which further reduces the costs of analyzing information and comparing it to data provided 
by other firms” (footnote omitted)); Sale, supra note 65, at 1049. 
92 Sale, supra note 65, at 1050. 
93 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Contracting for Employment: The Limited Return of the 
Common Law, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1783, 1786-91 (1996) (describing “contractual assymmetries” 
in employment relationship negotiations); Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect 
Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 
CORNELL L. REV. 105, 106 (1997) (providing “empirical evidence contradicting the 
assumption of full information” and documenting that “workers appear to systematically 
overestimate the protections afforded [them] by law”). 
94 See infra Section II.B. 
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employees from discussing pay in an effort to maintain negotiating leverage,95 
despite the fact that doing so is prohibited by the National Labor Relations Act.96 
Requiring certain employers to provide information about racial and gender 
distribution of pay and promotion opportunities and about the occurrence of 
harassment or discrimination settlements can provide applicants and current 
employees with information they otherwise lack. This may help applicants make 
informed choices about where to work or may help those in a position to 
negotiate pay to do so with an employer based on that employer’s data or that of 
a competitor. Information on a peer entity’s equality measures may spur an 
employer to further improvement as a competitive advantage. Employees and 
enforcement entities have a great deal to gain by correcting information 
asymmetries around pay, promotion, and harassment.  
2. Behavior-Forcing Effects 
While the stated goal of securities disclosure requirements is investor 
protection, a secondary feature of such requirements is the impact that having to 
produce disclosures has on the behavior of regulated parties—what Sale and 
colleagues have described as “the information-forcing-substance theory.”97 As 
Sale describes it, by focusing on disclosure rather than trying to regulate for 
“fairness,” securities laws and regulations “create incentives for directors to 
engage in a dialogue with management about the basis for any disclosures.”98 
The requirement to collect and produce information in turn may generate 
“substantive behavior—discourse with officers and management and 
potentially, changes in policies and procedures—on the part of directors.”99 
Because they are required to produce accurate disclosures for which they can be 
held accountable, company leadership may consider changing their actions—for 
example, as Sale suggests, by making different decisions about how to invest 
capital that could serve the company’s goals.100  
Combining disclosure requirements with enforcement mechanisms further 
strengthens these effects. Various provisions in securities law allow investors to 
sue companies and their directors for “affirmative misstatements and 
omissions.”101 One provision in particular, Section 11 of the Securities Act, 
 
95 See, e.g., INST. FOR WOMEN’S POL’Y RSCH., QUICK FIGURES: PAY SECRECY AND WAGE 
DISCRIMINATION 1 (2014), https://iwpr.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Q016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/642K-SK7C] (“About half of all workers . . . report that the discussion of 
wage and salary information is either discouraged or prohibited and/or could lead to 
punishment.”). 
96 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a); see also infra Sections II.C.2, III.A. 
97 Sale, supra note 65, at 1046-47. 
98 Id. at 1047. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 1050. 
101 See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77j(b), 77k(a), 77l(a)(2). 
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imposes strict liability on directors who mislead, subject to affirmative defenses 
for due diligence or acting with “candor.”102 These defenses provide further 
incentives for a company’s directors to both ensure that management is making 
accurate disclosures in the first place and to inform the SEC if management does 
not.103 As a result, the duty to produce accurate periodic disclosures encourages 
self-policing by directors and reduces “monitoring costs” for stockholders.104 
Drawing an analogy for the purposes of considering equality disclosures, the 
“information-forcing-substance” effects of disclosure requirements may 
arguably be even stronger in the context of antidiscrimination law than for 
securities law. First, many employers may be unaware of their own gender and 
racial pay gaps or lack of diverse leadership until they are forced to collect 
entity-wide data and see in the aggregate what are often made as a series of 
discretionary decisions. As one business adage suggests, you treasure what you 
measure;105 without an incentive to track pay and promotion differences by 
gender and race, some employers may be unaware that they have an inequality 
problem.106 Having to produce data on pay and promotion rates by protected 
category may also expose unexamined patterns of bias or discrimination that 
could open employers up to investigation by the EEOC or private lawsuits by 
employees. Moreover, being confronted by such data because of a duty to 
produce the disclosures has great potential to spark internal discussions and 
possible policy change within an organization—either out of a commitment to 
being more equitable, increased fear of liability, or the consequences of any 
inequity being exposed publicly.  
3. “Publicness” Effects 
Compelled disclosures in the securities context provide a related but separate 
third value from what Sale calls their “publicness.”107 SEC-covered entities 
 
102 Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, § 11, 48 Stat. 74, 82-83 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. 77k); accord Sale, supra note 65, at 1059. 
103 Sale, supra note 65, at 1059-61 (explaining that the candor defense “urges directors to 
push back internally and, when unsuccessful, to make a noisy exit through resignation”). 
104 Id. at 1050-51. 
105 See Dave Lavinsky, The Two Most Important Quotes in Business, GROWTHINK, 
https://www.growthink.com/content/two-most-important-quotes-business 
[https://perma.cc/G25N-5N2X] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020) (crediting business management 
expert Peter Drucker with saying, “If you can’t measure it, you can’t improve it”). 
106 Anecdotally, this was a result of several companies that expressed surprise at their own 
data once required to produce it under new U.K. pay-data reporting requirements. See infra 
Section III.A.1. 
107 Sale, supra note 65, at 1065 (“Publicness is a concept that encompasses the interplay 
between the inside players in the corporation (directors and officers) and outsiders—like 
media and analysts—who cover the company.”); see also Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. 
Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 
GEO. L.J. 337, 374 (2013); Lipton, Not Everything, supra note 83, at 510. Arguments around 
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produce disclosures that are published and accessible to third parties like the 
media and financial analysts; those who are in “the zone of publicness” then help 
contribute to accountability for businesses.108 For example, media coverage of 
concealment or omissions in financial disclosures can lead to shareholder 
lawsuits, state attorneys general investigations, and public-relations 
consequences.109 Because of this, business managers who ignore the public 
nature of their responsibilities to disclose required information accurately do so 
at their peril.110  
To the extent that any compelled equality disclosures are published,111 the 
“publicness” effects may be even stronger than in the context of required 
securities disclosures. Public exposure to the media and other interested third 
parties may translate into additional legal and public-relations consequences for 
employers with truly poor records of gender and racial equity and repeated 
reports of harassment. For example, plaintiff’s attorneys may be more willing to 
represent employees against an employer with a public record demonstrating a 
significant racial or gender pay or promotion gap. Of course, the existence of a 
gap in no way proves that discrimination, rather than real demographic or 
performance differences, caused any individual pay or promotion decision;112 
but, such data may indicate an employer’s blind spot for which a private attorney 
may be willing to intervene. Media coverage of data that indicates egregious pay 
or promotion gaps may also spur public activism, particularly for consumer-
facing businesses—for example, a call to boycott or divest from a company.113 
 
“publicness” are also consistent with scholars who have studied the reputational effects of 
public exposure through litigation. See, e.g., Kishanthi Parella, Reputational Regulation, 67 
DUKE L.J. 907, 913 (2018) (describing the “information-transmission function of litigation: 
litigation as a mechanism to disseminate information in society at large”); Roy Shapira, 
Reputation Through Litigation: How the Legal System Shapes Behavior by Producing 
Information, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1193, 1196 (2016) (arguing that information about litigation 
against a company forces “the company’s stakeholders [to] update their beliefs about the 
company and assess whether they want to continue doing business with it”). Relatedly, a 
recent study documented that simply having a regulatory agency publicize legal violations 
significantly improved compliance by both the violating entity and its peers. See Matthew S. 
Johnson, Regulation by Shaming: Deterrence Effects of Publicizing Violations of Workplace 
Safety and Health Laws, 110 AM. ECON. REV. 1866, 1866-69 (2020) (documenting that, when 
the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration issued press releases about employer 
violations, “it led other facilities to substantially improve their compliance” and led “to 
substantial improvements in workplace safety and health” overall). 
108 Sale, supra note 65, at 1065-67. 
109 Id. at 1065-68 (discussing consequences faced by Exxon and Wells Fargo for failing to 
disclose problems related to climate change and legal issues, respectively). 
110 Id. 
111 This is an open question based on Title VII’s confidentiality requirements. See infra 
Part III, Section IV.B. 
112 See infra Section II.C.2, Part IV. 
113 See, e.g., Joanne Moseley, Calls to Boycott Company with 64.8% Gender Pay Gap, 
IRWIN MITCHELL (Jan. 18, 2018), https://imbusiness.passle.net/post/102eoby/calls-to-
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Thus, the public relations impact of any compelled equality disclosures may 
spark additional reforms. 
***** 
Compelled disclosures in securities law serve a particular purpose and are not 
directly applicable outside of the financial context. Nevertheless, the regime 
provides useful theoretical underpinnings for this Article’s proposal to compel 
employer disclosures under antidiscrimination law. Properly constructed, 
equality disclosures could correct information asymmetry between employers 
and employees and spur greater compliance efforts by employers faced with 
having to produce such disclosures and experience their public consequences. 
While securities disclosure law is neither a panacea for regulating business 
entities nor directly applicable to the antidiscrimination context, it suggests 
several strong rationales for the utility of a disclosure regime to combat 
employment discrimination. 
B. The Lessons of Exposure from #MeToo and Time’s Up 
While securities law provides the theoretical arguments for bringing a 
disclosure regime to antidiscrimination law, the #MeToo and Time’s Up 
movements demonstrate the overwhelming normative need to do so. Originally 
founded in 2007 by advocate Tarana Burke as a movement to support survivors 
of sexual assault, the #MeToo movement took on a new life when actress Alyssa 
Milano used the hashtag #MeToo in a Twitter post in October 2017, calling for 
people who had experienced sexual harassment or assault to respond “me 
too.”114 Within 24 hours, the hashtag was used 12 million times.115 Within two 
years, thousands of people had shared their stories of sexual harassment and 
assault, and the issue of sexual harassment at work became a major public 
concern.116 Public outcry over stories of egregious sexual harassment by men in 
 
boycott-company-with-64-8-gender-pay-gap [https://perma.cc/ADH6-A9GZ] (describing 
how, after “the BBC reported on a number of high profile organisations that . . . revealed 
gender pay gaps considerably above the national average,” British politician Jess Phillips 
“call[ed] on her Twitter feed for women to ‘vote with their feet’ and boycott” retailer Phase 
Eight, which was “singled out as the firm with the biggest gender pay gap (so far) - with a 
64.8% lower mean hourly rate for female staff”); see also Jess Phillips MP (@jessphillips), 
TWITTER (Jan 7, 2018, 2:21 AM), https://twitter.com/jessphillips/status 
/949918947398299648 [https://perma.cc/ZJK2-6LRD]. 
114 Sandra E. Garcia, The Woman Who Created #MeToo Long Before Hashtags, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/20/us/me-too-movement-tarana-
burke.html; Alyssa Milano (@Alyssa_Milano), TWITTER (Oct 15, 2017, 4:21 PM), 
https://twitter.com/alyssa_milano/status/919659438700670976 [https://perma.cc/YW4G-
B6T7]. 
115 Garcia, supra note 114. 
116 Frances Perraudin, #MeToo Two Years On: Weinstein Allegations ‘Tip of Iceberg’, Say 
Accusers, GUARDIAN (Oct. 14, 2019, 1:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world 
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leadership positions within the entertainment industry led to the ousting of 
hundreds of men considered sexual predators at work, including Harvey 
Weinstein, Matt Lauer, Charlie Rose, Mario Batali, Les Moonves, and more.117 
As a result of the massive outpouring of stories of women’s exploitation at 
work, a group of advocates launched a second organization, Time’s Up, to focus 
on the issues of unequal pay and gender inequality in hiring and promotion.118 
Again, public exposure of stories of unequal pay for female movie stars 
including Jennifer Lawrence and Michelle Williams sparked policy changes by 
agencies and movie studios, such as commitments to hiring more women.119 
Both movements also inspired legislative reforms across the country.120 
These social movements suggest two compelling arguments for the need to 
adopt disclosure requirements in the antidiscrimination law context. First, they 
provide an unprecedented level of documentation of the pervasive 
underreporting of sexual and racial harassment and unequal pay and promotion 
along racial and gender lines. While those who study discrimination have long 
known that many incidents go unreported, the two movements showed, for the 
first time, the massive scope of the problem and the widely pervasive fear of 
retaliation and professional consequences that suppress reporting. Two books by 
the investigative reporters who broke the story of the Harvey Weinstein 
harassment and assault allegations document one example of the complex 
institutional structures and systems of secrecy designed to protect powerful 
executives accused of sexual harassment and the extreme forms of retaliation 
that harassment accusers may face.121 Over three years after Alyssa Milano 




117 Audrey Carlsen, Maya Salam, Claire Cain Miller, Denise Lu, Ash Ngu, Jugal K. Patel 
& Zach Wichter, #MeToo Brought Down 201 Powerful Men. Nearly Half of Their 
Replacements Are Women., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive 
/2018/10/23/us/metoo-replacements.html. 
118 Our Story, TIME’S UP, https://timesupnow.org/about/our-story/ [https://perma.cc 
/P9TK-ZVSD] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020). 
119 See Carlsen et al., supra note 117; Yohana Desta, Michelle Williams Says Pay-Gap 
Controversy “Paralyzed” Her, VANITY FAIR (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.vanityfair.com 
/hollywood/2019/04/michelle-williams-wage-gap-paycheck-fairness-act 
[https://perma.cc/78KD-SP7B]; Jennifer Lawrence, Why Do I Make Less Than My Male 
Co‑Stars?, LENNY (Oct. 13, 2015), https://us11.campaign-archive.com/?u 
=a5b04a26aae05a24bc4efb63e&id=64e6f35176&e=1ba99d671e#wage 
[https://perma.cc/W5BK-LLCE]. 
120 See #MeToo, Time’s Up and the Legislation Behind the Movement, BILL TRACK 50 
(Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.billtrack50.com/blog/social-issues/civil-rights/metoo-times-up-
and-the-legislation-behind-the-movement [https://perma.cc/P6W3-DS9D]. 
121 RONAN FARROW, CATCH AND KILL: LIES, SPIES, AND A CONSPIRACY TO PROTECT 
PREDATORS (2019); JODI KANTOR & MEGAN TWOHEY, SHE SAID: BREAKING THE SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT STORY THAT HELPED IGNITE A MOVEMENT (2019). 
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Burke started the movement—there is simply no question that placing near-total 
responsibility for pursuing harassment and discrimination complaints on 
individual employees has a deeply chilling effect on antidiscrimination 
enforcement.  
Second, the severe consequences for sexual harassers whose victims finally 
felt supported to report shows the power of public exposure of discrimination. 
Once disclosed, the stories of inequality and exploitation led to swift, remedial 
action. Only one year after the popularization of the #MeToo hashtag, the New 
York Times reported that the movement had “brought down” over 200 “powerful 
men.”122 Yet while public exposure led to a groundswell that shocked many 
entities into action where passivity had otherwise set in, it did so in an ad hoc 
way that was subject to criticism by some commentators for failing to meet 
comport with due process.123  
Regardless of individual procedural concerns, whether or not warranted,124 it 
is accurate to say that the public exposure impacts of the #MeToo and Time’s 
Up movements were massive and powerful but uncomprehensive and 
individualized. Thus taking the power of exposure but systematizing it—
channeling it into a concrete and routinized disclosure regime that requires 
employers to provide comparable information—offers a mechanism to harness 
the power of sunshine with clear process protections. 
C. A Role for Disclosures in Antidiscrimination Law 
In response to concerns over pervasive, unaddressed harassment and pay 
discrimination, legal scholars have focused primarily on strengthening 
antiretaliation protections and increasing pay transparency to encourage 
employees to pursue private discrimination claims.125 This Section makes the 
case that, while necessary, private ordering efforts are not sufficient; 
antidiscrimination law enforcement requires a public law component to move 
from reactive to proactive and from increasing transparency to fostering 
accountability. Moreover, given chronic levels of underenforcement, the U.S. 
government has an obligation to do more to protect citizens from workplace 
discrimination than serve as a mere gatekeeper for victims to enforce the law 
themselves—an obligation that a disclosure regime can help achieve.  
 
122 Carlsen et al., supra note 117. 
123 See Jessica A. Clarke, The Rules of #MeToo, 2019 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 37, 37-40 
(describing due process criticisms). 
124 Id. at 40-41 (arguing that not every #MeToo decision is procedurally sound but that 
high-profile cases are safeguarded by extralegal norms). 
125 See infra Section II.C.1. 
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1. Retaliation Protections Are Not Enough: From Ex-Post to Ex-Ante 
Action 
To increase discrimination reporting, and in the wake of the #MeToo and 
Time’s Up movements, some legal scholars have focused on increasing 
discrimination complaints by strengthening antiretaliation law. Porter and 
Sperino have suggested, among other reforms, extending retaliation protections 
to cover complaints based on a “good faith” rather than a “reasonable” belief 
that the law has been violated and broadening what constitutes a “materially 
adverse action” to include a wider array of retaliatory harms.126 Brake has 
proposed that, particularly in light of a growing backlash against harassment 
complaints in the wake of #MeToo, retaliation law’s “expressive force” can help 
set norms for “appropriate, non-retaliatory responses to sexual harassment 
complaints.”127 
While strengthening antiretaliation protections would be necessary and 
warranted to improve antidiscrimination enforcement, it is not sufficient. When 
employees are solely responsible for reporting harassment and discrimination, 
they will always fear reprisals despite even the most robust antiretaliation 
protections. As Porter explains, “the fear of retaliation is often enough to stop 
an employee from reporting harassment”; despite believing that they could win 
a retaliation lawsuit, most employees would “still choose to avoid the negative 
consequences of retaliation in the first place.”128  
Focusing on the problem of retaliation ex post, after discrimination remains 
backward-looking and maintains near-total reliance on employee victims to 
pursue complaints. Instead, the law should shift some reporting and compliance 
requirements onto employers directly to reduce discrimination ex ante. 
2. Information Forcing in a Time of Secrecy: From Transparency to 
Accountability 
Likewise, to increase enforcement around pay discrimination, some legal 
scholars and legislators have focused on the value of pay transparency129—the 
idea that requiring employers to provide information to employees about 
available pay and who is paid what can reduce gender-based pay gaps and 
discrimination. For example, Cynthia Estlund has argued that pay transparency 
 
126 See Porter, supra note 51, at 56-58; Sperino, supra note 52, at 2062-63. 
127 See Deborah L. Brake, Coworker Retaliation in the #MeToo Era, 49 U. BALT. L. REV. 
1, 5 (2019). 
128 Porter, supra note 51, at 58 (emphasis omitted). 
129 See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 17, at 986-98 (discussing the consequences of pay 
secrecy); Estlund, Extending the Case, supra note 16, at 783 (“[M]andatory disclosure of 
meaningful salary information . . . tend[s] to produce less discrimination . . . and probably 
somewhat lower disparities overall”); Lobel, supra note 17, at 548-50 (discussing the power 
of correcting knowledge disparities on pay); Ramachandran, supra note 17, at 1062 
(proposing pay transparency to help correct discrimination). 
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can both “enhance employees’ bargaining power”130 and “aid in the enforcement 
of antidiscrimination law” because “[n]o one can know whether she is the victim 
of pay discrimination without comparing her pay to that of others.”131 Orly Lobel 
has suggested that pay transparency reforms can “structurally change the ways 
in which salaries are negotiated, determined, and, subsequently, detected, and 
contested,” providing “a central innovation” of reversing information flows in 
the wage market to correct information asymmetries.132  
As this Article envisions it, a mandatory disclosure regime would be an 
expansion of existing efforts to increase pay transparency. But, importantly, 
while pay transparency is often raised in the context of private law and 
individual negotiation, applying mandatory disclosures to a public regulatory 
agency go beyond a private law scheme toward a more comprehensive approach 
that can lead to greater public accountability.133 A chief goal of current pay 
transparency efforts is their private ordering effects of information sharing to 
support plaintiffs’ efforts at negotiation or to bring private lawsuits—for 
example, as discussed in Part III, new state laws that require employers to 
provide salary pay ranges to employees who request them when hired.134 A more 
comprehensive public disclosure requirement can lead to greater accountability 
across employers and industries as well as beyond individual actors. 
In addition, compelled disclosure will address the particular need for public 
reporting in an era when employment discrimination and harassment complaints 
are increasingly resolved through confidential settlement and hidden arbitration. 
If pay transparency’s main effect is to help individual employees discover 
discrimination so that they can pursue litigation, its benefits to others are entirely 
lost for any such claim covered by a mandatory arbitration agreement or that 
results in a confidential settlement.135  
3. Enforcement Role of the State: From Gatekeeper to Enforcer 
Lastly, the chronic underenforcement of antidiscrimination law indicates a 
deeper problem at which a disclosure regime is aimed: U.S. law must do more 
to enforce the rights of victims of discrimination and harassment than merely 
facilitate their ability to sue privately. As legal scholars have documented, a 
 
130 Estlund, Extending the Case, supra note 16, at 788. 
131 Id. at 785. 
132 Lobel, supra note 17, at 549. 
133 See Estlund, Extending the Case, supra note 16, at 783-85; Estlund, Just the Facts, 
supra note 16, at 373-75; Lobel, supra note 17, at 600-05; infra Section III.B. 
134 See Lobel, supra note 17, at 558-62 (noting how changes in hiring information impact 
efforts to close the gender pay gap); infra Section III.A.1. 
135 Nancy Modesitt, Why Pay Transparency Alone Won’t Eliminate the Persistent Wage 
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great deal of EEOC resources go to a mostly gatekeeping role,136 and 
enforcement suffers when employees are left to their own devices to enforce the 
federal laws that protect them from discrimination.137 Given fear of retaliation138 
and U.S. models of litigation financing,139 relying on employees’ private 
lawsuits as our main enforcement mechanism for civil rights law is not enough. 
Both employers and the EEOC can and should play a larger role in ensuring that 
workplaces are free from discrimination and harassment. 
Adding a disclosure requirement is far from a comprehensive increase of 
resources and public enforcement, but it does offer an incremental step. First, it 
requires more of employer entities, forcing them to engage in public self-
policing that may improve their behavior. Second, systematic collection of 
information on the problem can help the EEOC and private enforcers target their 
resources more effectively. Third, the information itself will help document the 
scope of the problem in a verified, comprehensive way that tweets and individual 
stories cannot, which may increase public awareness of the problem and political 
support for a future increase in resources for public enforcement. Particularly in 
an era of increasing mandatory arbitration clauses and confidential settlements, 
public documentation is essential to exposing racial and gender discrimination 
and harassment, which remain systemic problems with structural components 
that we have failed to adequately redress.140  
III. MODELS FOR FORCING DISCLOSURE OF DISCRIMINATION 
This Article has provided both the normative case for the need to rebalance 
enforcement responsibility for antidiscrimination law and the theoretical case 
for using compelled disclosures on equality measures as a means of doing so. 
This Part now turns to the practical challenge of crafting affirmative disclosure 
requirements for employers under federal law, focusing on three key areas of 
persistent racial and gender inequality: pay, promotion, and harassment.141 To 
 
136 See, e.g., Engstrom, supra note 6, at 646-52. 
137 See, e.g., Brake & Grossman, supra note 6, at 861-62 (noting that “at many different 
junctures” of the rights-claiming process, “employees are stymied and deterred in their efforts 
to take [the] initiative” to come forward to enforce antidiscrimination laws). See generally 
ELLEN BERREY, ROBERT L. NELSON, & LAURA BETH NIELSEN, RIGHTS ON TRIAL: HOW 
WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION LAW PERPETUATES INEQUALITY (2017) (documenting the 
limitations of an adversarial approach to workplace discrimination law that relies on 
employee-initiated litigation). 
138 See supra Section I.B. 
139 See supra Section I.A. 
140 See Hemel & Lund, supra note 19, at 1678 (“[I]f securities law forces publicly traded 
companies to disclose large sexual harassment settlements or allegations against executives, 
those revelations—insofar as they supply further evidence of the problem’s prevalence—may 
add further fuel to the push for legal reform.”). 
141 Notably, as explained previously, this Article focuses on mandatory reporting 
requirements to governmental regulators. As such, this Part does not discuss the role of 
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do so, this Part looks to examples of similar disclosure laws recently enacted in 
other high-income countries, as well as emerging models in some U.S. state 
laws. It then proposes a framework for requiring disclosures under U.S. federal 
law, identifying and building upon equality-related data already collected by 
some federal government agencies. As this Part argues, creating a cohesive 
mandatory disclosure scheme under federal antidiscrimination law does not 
require starting from scratch but rather expanding and improving current efforts, 
with the potential to vastly improve enforcement. 
A. Pay Data to Close Gender and Racial Pay Gaps 
Pay inequality by gender and race is a persistent, seemingly intractable 
problem that current antidiscrimination law has failed to solve, as underscored 
by the Time’s Up movement. It has been nearly six decades since federal law 
prohibited discrimination in pay by sex and race,142 yet significant gender and 
racial pay gaps remain.143 In the most recent data, when comparing all women 
to all men working full time all year, women earned only eighty-two cents on 
the dollar to men, an 18% pay gap.144 For women of color, the pay gap is even 
greater: Black women make sixty-two cents and Latinx women fifty-four cents 
to each dollar earned by White men, 38% and 46% gaps respectively.145 The 
racial pay gap between White men and men of color is also stark; in recent data 
comparing median pay, Black and Latinx men earned just seventy-one cents on 
the dollar compared to White men, a whopping 29% gap in average pay.146 Most 
troublingly, both gender and racial pay gaps have been stuck at close to these 
ratios for over two decades.147 Of course, a significant portion of both racial and 
gender pay gaps are caused not by discrimination but by actual demographic 
differences, including differences in experience and education (for racial pay 
gaps) and working hours (for gender pay gaps).148 Yet even after adjusting the 
 
voluntary disclosures by business entities either to the public or to their own employees—
topics that are beyond the scope of this Article’s focus on public enforcement efforts to relieve 
the enforcement burden on individual employees. For more on private law arguments, see 
sources cited supra note 17. 
142 See Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified as amended at 29 
U.S.C. § 206(d)); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 247 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e). 
143 See Stephanie Bornstein, Equal Work, 77 MD. L. REV. 581, 590-92 (2018). 
144 AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, THE SIMPLE TRUTH ABOUT THE GENDER PAY GAP: FALL 
2019 UPDATE 1 (2019) [hereinafter THE SIMPLE TRUTH], https://ww3.aauw.org/aauw 
_check/files/2016/02/Simple-Truth-Update-2019_v2-002.pdf [https://perma.cc/6QM5-
SB5F]. 
145 See Bornstein, supra note 143, at 591-92. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 592-93. 
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data to account for all such differences, pay gaps remain.149 Economists now 
attribute between one-third and one-half of both gender and racial pay gaps to 
workforce segregation and discrimination,150 causes that antidiscrimination law 
should be able to reach and remedy.  
A mandatory disclosure requirement that collects and publishes pay data by 
race and gender stands to have a dramatic effect on exposing and rooting out the 
portion of the racial and gender pay gaps that result from discrimination. Recent 
data shows that the gender pay gap is smaller when salary information is 
transparent and known like, for example, in the federal public sector.151 Yet 
sharing information among employees and within an individual employer is only 
the first step.152 Reaping the full benefit of pay transparency requires a 
comprehensive approach in which employers are required to report pay data 
publicly and in a consistent fashion to force greater internal accountability and 
provide comparable data for employees, enforcers, and the public.153 
1. Current Comparative Examples 
The move to combat the gender pay gap globally has sparked a number of pay 
data collection laws. Over the past decade, spurred by their own persistent 
gender pay gaps and a 2014 recommendation by the European Commission to 
member states,154 over a dozen European and other high-income countries have 
enacted some form of pay-data reporting requirements on large employers.155 
 
149 Id. at 594. 
150 Id. at 585, 587-88. 
151 See, e.g., THE SIMPLE TRUTH, supra note 144, at 3 (“The pay gap is smaller for workers 
in sectors where pay transparency is mandated: For example, federal government workers 
experience a 13% pay gap between men and women; in the private, for-profit sector, that 
number jumps to 29%.”). Notably, both union and federal-sector workers also have banded 
pay ranges, which are a large part of why their pay gaps are smaller. See Bornstein, supra 
note 143, at 638. 
152 See Modesitt, supra note 135; supra Section II.C.2. 
153 See supra Sections II.A, II.C.2. 
154 Lynne Bernabei & Kristen Sinisi, Gender Pay Data: Impact of European Laws in the 
US, LAW360 (May 11, 2018 11:40 AM), https://www.law360.com/publicpolicy/articles 
/1041706. 
155 As of April 2019, these include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Chile, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. See 
WORKPLACE GENDER EQUAL. AGENCY, AUSTL. GOV’T, INTERNATIONAL GENDER EQUALITY 
REPORTING SCHEMES 11 (2019) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL REPORTING SCHEMES], 
https://www.wgea.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/2019-04-
4%20International%20reporting%20schemes_Final_for_web_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/P3U3-
2ZCF]. Some provinces of Canada and India have related laws as well. See DLA PIPER, 
GENDER PAY REPORTING: AN INTERNATIONAL SURVEY (SEPTEMBER 2018), at 11-19, 32-35 
(2018), https://www.dlapiper.com/~/media/files/insights/events/2018/11/international 
_gender_pay_gap_report_2018_us.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y7H4-LJC7]; see also EUR. 
COMM’N, PAY TRANSPARENCY: TIME TO SEE THE GAP! 4 (2019), https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites 
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These reporting schemes range from imposing light to moderate to robust 
obligations on employer entities.156 As such, they provide a variety of 
approaches from which U.S. law could draw.  
On the lightest touch side of this spectrum, several countries require that 
employers collect and report data on gender pay gaps internally to 
representatives from unions or employee “councils,” who then “monitor the 
status” of gender pay equality at the firm.157 For example, Austria requires 
employers of 150 or more employees to provide a report on “gender composition 
and income data” to internal “work council[s]” or, if none, all employees every 
two years.158 While such an approach offers pay transparency, it relies on a 
robust system of unions or work councils, which the United States lacks,159 or 
private enforcement, with its challenges described previously.160  
On the opposite end of the spectrum, Iceland requires even small companies 
to certify that their pay structures comply with government standards for equal 
pay, representing the strongest equal pay protection laws to date.161 In 2017, 
Iceland enacted requirements that all employers of twenty-five or more 
employees conduct a pay audit in accordance with government standards to 
receive an official equal pay “certification” from the government.162 Employers 
 
/info/files/factsheet-pay_transparency-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9PZ-GR66]; The Gender 
Pay Gap Situation in the EU, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-
fundamental-rights/gender-equality/equal-pay/gender-pay-gap-situation-eu_en#differences-
between-the-eu-countries [https://perma.cc/D4YX-C9VG] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020). 
156 INTERNATIONAL REPORTING SCHEMES, supra note 155, at 5. In a recent report, the 
Australian Government’s Workplace Gender Equality Agency analyzed these laws as falling 
into five categories (listed here from weakest to strongest): (1) “[l]imited external 
transparency,” requiring reporting of gender pay gaps to “internal work councils”; 
(2) “[c]omprehensive,” requiring submission of data on multiple indicators to a federal 
agency; (3) “[t]ransparency,” requiring reporting on gaps to a government agency for 
publication; (4) “[t]ransparency and accountability,” requiring public reporting plus 
“demonstrate[d] actions to close gender pay gaps”; and (5) “[l]egislation,” requiring 
certification of compliance with government equal pay standards. Id. 
157 Id. at 11. 
158 Id. at 12; accord BUNDES-GLEICHBEHANDLUNGSGESETZ [B-GBG] [FEDERAL EQUAL 
TREATMENT ACT] BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL] No. 100/1993 (Austria). 
159 Eric Morath, U.S. Union Membership Hits Another Record Low, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 22, 
2020, 1:19 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-union-membership-hits-another-record-
low-11579715320 (explaining that in 2019, only 10.3% of U.S. workforce and 6.2% of private 
sector employees are union members according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics). 
160 See supra Part I, Section II.C.1. 
161 INTERNATIONAL REPORTING SCHEMES, supra note 155, at 9. 
162 ÞORSTEINN VÍGLUNDSSON, REGULATION: THE CERTIFICATION OF EQUAL PAY SYSTEMS 
OF COMPANIES AND INSTITUTIONS ACCORDING TO THE ÍST 85 STANDARD, No. 1030, art. 7 
(2017), https://www.government.is/library/04-Legislation/Regulation 
_CertificatinOfEqualPaySytems_25012018.pdf [https://perma.cc/PW8Y-PQX4]; 
VELFERÐARRÁÐUNEYTIÐ MINISTRY OF WELFARE, ACT ON EQUAL STATUS AND EQUAL RIGHTS 
OF WOMEN AND MEN, NO. 10/2008, AS AMENDED BY ACT NO. 56/2017, art. 19 (2014), 
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must submit their pay data to a third-party “accredited auditor” that reviews and 
certifies that their compensation system complies with the government’s 
“Standard ÍST 85.”163 Certification demonstrates “that wages paid by the 
company . . . are at all times determined in the same way for women and men, 
and that the considerations on which decisions on wage are based do not involve 
discrimination on grounds of gender.”164 Companies that fail to submit their data 
within four years of the law’s effective date of January 2018 may be subject to 
daily fines for noncompliance.165 While certainly the most likely to correct any 
discrimination in pay, such a heavy-handed policy that interferes with employer 
discretion about pay setting is likely to be a nonstarter in the United States.166  
Toward the middle of this spectrum, several countries impose a moderate 




mended%200101%202018%20final.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y6D6-CBBK]; Equal Pay 
Certification, GOV’T ICE., https://www.government.is/topics/human-rights-and-equality 
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Lauren Collins, What Women Want, NEW YORKER, July 23, 2018, at 34, 42 (“The law is 
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163 Equal Pay Certification, supra note 162. 
164 Id. (click “03. What is equal pay certification?”). 
165 Jon Henley, ‘Equality Won’t Happen By Itself’: How Iceland Got Tough on Gender 
Pay Gap, GUARDIAN (Feb. 20, 2018, 3:22 AM), https://www.theguardian.com 
/world/2018/feb/20/iceland-equal-pay-law-gender-gap-women-jobs-equality 
[https://perma.cc/8TRC-T68L]. 
166 See Lauren B. Edelman, Linda H. Krieger, Scott R. Eliason, Catherine R. Albiston & 
Virginia Mellema, When Organizations Rule: Judicial Deference to Institutionalized 
Employment Structures, 117 AM. J. SOCIO. 888, 894 (2011) (documenting how “judges simply 
defer to the [organizational] structure, assuming that the mere presence of the structure means 
that the organization is complying with civil rights law”); Jordain Carney, McConnell Pledges 
to Be ‘Grim Reaper’ for Progressive Policies, HILL (Apr. 22, 2019, 2:43 PM), 
https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/440041-mcconnell-pledges-to-be-grim-reaper-for-
progressive-policies [https://perma.cc/2ZD3-UX2F]. However, one U.S. state comes close to 
something of this sort in its public contracting. In Minnesota, employers of 40 or more who 
seek to obtain a contract from the state government for a value of $500,000 or more must 
complete an Equal Pay Certification from the state that requires the employer to certify, inter 
alia, 
that the average compensation for its female employees is not consistently below the 
average compensation for its male employees within each of the major job categories in 
the EEO-1 employee information report for which an employee is expected to perform 
work under the contract, taking into account factors such as length of service, 
requirements of specific jobs, experience, skill, effort, responsibility, working conditions 
of the job, or other mitigating factors. 
MINN. STAT. § 363A.44(2)(a)(2) (2020); see also Equal Pay Certificate, MINN. DEP’T OF HUM. 
RTS., https://mn.gov/mdhr/certificates/apply-renew/equal-pay-certificate/ (last visited Dec. 
28, 2020). 
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publication—a model likely most appropriate for informing U.S. federal law. In 
2016, the United Kingdom passed new regulations to its Equality Act requiring 
private employers of 250 or more to report gender pay gap data annually.167 The 
Act went into effect on April 6, 2017, with the first reporting required one year 
later in April 2018.168 Covered companies must collect data as a “snapshot” 
every April 5 on hourly and bonus pay and on earnings ranges by gender.169 
They must then follow instructions to calculate and produce data on six 
measures: mean and median pay gaps by gender in both hourly and bonus pay, 
proportion of each gender receiving a bonus, and proportion of each gender 
earning each quartile of pay.170 Once complete, employers must publish these 
six calculations along with a written statement describing their results on their 
own “public-facing website” and report their data to the U.K. government’s 
“gender pay gap reporting service,” where it is also made public.171 Any failure 
to produce accurate data on time may be subject to “legal action from the 
Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), leading to court orders and 
fines.”172 The law goes beyond pay transparency for employees’ and applicants’ 
own information; by “increasing public scrutiny” of each company’s gender pay 
disparities,173 it creates accountability likely to spur internal change.174 
While only recently enacted, data on the impact of the British approach has 
been stark. Anecdotally, in the months after the first reports were due in April 
2018, companies that discovered their own significant gender pay gaps only after 
complying with the reporting requirements promised to improve gender 
equality.175 After reporting the largest average gender pay gap in the country’s 
media industry—37%—despite having three times more female than male 
 
167 The Equality Act 2010 (Gender Pay Gap Information) Regulations 2017, SI 2017/172, 
art. 2 (U.K.). 
168 Amie Tsang, New Rule Aims to Close Pay Gap in British Companies, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
7, 2017, at B2. 
169 The Equality Act 2010 (Gender Pay Gap Information) Regulations 2017, SI 2017/172, 
art. 2 (U.K.); see also Collins, supra note 162, at 40. 
170 Guidance: Gender Pay Gap Reporting: Make Your Calculations, GOV.UK, 
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/gender-pay-gap-reporting-make-your-calculations 
[https://perma.cc/Y7DY-R24Y] (last updated Mar. 25, 2020). 
171 Search and Compare Gender Pay Gap Data, GOV.UK, https://gender-pay-
gap.service.gov.uk [https://perma.cc/6Z84-VUX6] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020); Guidance; 
Gender Pay Gap Reporting: Overview, GOV.UK [hereinafter UK Overview], 
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/gender-pay-gap-reporting-overview [https://perma.cc/2K95-
KP3N] (last updated Mar. 25, 2020) (summarizing reporting requirements for covered U.K. 
companies). 
172 UK Overview, supra note 171. 
173 Collins, supra note 162, at 40; see also Liz Alderman, Britain Aims to Close Pay Gap 
with Transparency and Shame, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2018, at B1. 
174 See supra Section II.A. 
175 Collins, supra note 162, at 41. 
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employees,176 publishing giant Condé Nast promised to correct the significant 
gap in their top quartile of earnings due in part to male-dominated leadership.177 
After disclosing a nearly 52% mean gender pay gap, the CEO of the airline 
EasyJet took a voluntary £34,000 pay cut to reduce his pay to that earned by his 
female predecessor, reflecting his “‘personal commitment’ to equality.”178  
Quantitative data showed that, at the first-year reporting deadline of April 
2018, 80% of approximately 10,000 employers reporting had a gender pay gap, 
nearly one-third of which reported a pay gap over the United Kingdom’s 18.4% 
national median.179 One year later, little had changed, with the same 80% of 
employers reporting a pay gap and “negligible” improvement in the average gap, 
shrinking from 9.7% in 2018 to 9.6% in 2019.180 This was largely attributable to 
the lack of women in the highest paid quartile, another statistic that moved in 
miniscule fashion from 2018 to 2019, from 37% to 38% of earners in reporting 
employers’ top pay quartiles.181 Those working on pay-gap issues anticipated 
that change would not happen overnight and instead that trends would improve 
after several years.182  
Yet there is no doubt that collecting and publishing the data is starting to have 
an impact, particularly on high-profile individual employers. For example, the 
Guardian News and Media group committed to increasing gender diversity in 
the leadership ranks of their organization and successfully reduced their gender 
 
176 Corinne Purtill, Condé Nast Has More Women than Men at Every Pay Grade and Still 




co%2Dworkers%20do [https://perma.cc/778C-QQU5]; see also Charlotte Tobitt, Gender Pay 
Gap Figures in Full: Conde Nast, Telegraph and Economist Groups Among Worst Offenders 




177 Collins, supra note 162, at 40; Tobitt, supra note 176. 
178 Collins, supra note 162, at 40. 
179 Alexandra Topping, Caelainn Barr & Pamela Duncan, Gender Pay Gap Figures Reveal 
Eight in 10 UK Firms Pay Men More, GUARDIAN (Apr. 4, 2018, 2:14 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/money/2018/apr/04/gender-pay-gap-figures-reveal-eight-in-
10-uk-firms-pay-men-more [https://perma.cc/76PR-XJ6D]. 
180 Caelainn Barr, Niko Kommenda & Caroline Davies, Gender Pay Gap: What Did We 




182 Id. (“Helene Reardon Bond, gender pay gap consultant and former head of policy at the 
Government Equalities Office, said a big reduction in the gender pay gap of most 
organisations was unlikely. ‘It will take a few years for the trends to appear and for meaningful 
action and good practice to kick in,’ she said.”). 
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pay gap from 12.1% in 2017 to 8.4% in 2018 and 4.9% in 2019, cutting their 
gap by more than half over just two years.183 But Condé Nast and EasyJet, both 
shocked at the gaps they discovered when reporting in 2017, showed mixed 
results in 2018: Condé Nast decreased their average hourly wage gap from 37% 
to 31%,184 but EasyJet’s gap increased from 51.7% to 54%.185 A lack of 
improvement spurred further action in some industries, including attracting 
signatories to the United Kingdom’s Women in Finance Charter, to which over 
330 companies in the financial services sector have pledged.186 Indeed, the data 
collection and publication process will likely have its ups and downs and take 
several years to show real progress, but there is no doubt that the law has made 
a significant impact on measuring and beginning to address unequal pay. To 
date, the EU has not required the same data collection by race or ethnicity but 
has begun to explore the issue.187 And more than a dozen top employers signed 
a pledge to voluntarily provide such data in the wake of the gender-pay-gap 
reporting requirements and assist others who wish to do so with a toolkit.188 
 
183 Charlotte Tobitt, Gender Pay Gap Figures 2018: Telegraph, Reuters, ITN, Guardian, 
BBC and FT Publish Reduced Wage Gaps + Full List So Far, PRESS GAZETTE (July 17, 2018), 
https://www.pressgazette.co.uk/gender-pay-gap-figures-2018-guardian-bbc-and-ft-first-
media-organisations-to-publish-reduced-wage-gaps-full-list-so-far/ [https://perma.cc/F8HX-
69RR]; Charlotte Tobitt, Gender Pay Gap: Pay Disparity Increased at Six in Ten UK News 
Media Companies in 2019, PRESS GAZETTE (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.pressgazette.co.uk 
/gender-pay-gap-pay-disparity-increased-at-six-in-ten-uk-news-media-companies-in-2019/ 
[https://perma.cc/4N2F-8UKR]. 
184 Compare Conde Nast Publications Limited (The): Gender Pay Gap Report, GOV.UK 
(Apr. 5, 2017), https://gender-pay-gap.service.gov.uk/Employer/ndQZEJnl/2017 
[https://perma.cc/Q23B-QZE2], with Conde Nast Publications Limited (The): Gender Pay 
Gap Report, GOV.UK (Apr. 5, 2018), https://gender-pay-gap.service.gov.uk/Employer 
/ndQZEJnl/2018 [https://perma.cc /CJZ7-2QMU]. 
185 Compare EasyJet Airline Company Limited: Gender Pay Gap Report, GOV.UK (Apr. 
5, 2017), https://gender-pay-gap.service.gov.uk/Employer/EMxvV2qy/2017 
[https://perma.cc/SX29-NXQV], with EasyJet Airline Company Limited: Gender Pay Gap 
Report, GOV.UK (Apr. 5, 2018), https://gender-pay-gap.service.gov.uk/Employer 
/EMxvV2qy/2018 [https://perma.cc/76EC-T3NM]. 
186 HM TREASURY, WOMEN IN FINANCE CHARTER (2020), https://assets.publishing.service 
.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/519620/women 
_in_finance_charter.pdf [https://perma.cc/PQ8G-N2NL]; see also Barr, Kommenda & 
Davies, supra note 180 (“John Glen, economic secretary to the Treasury, said: ‘Gender pay 
gap reporting has shone a light on the inequalities women experience, and it’s clear that the 
financial sector needs to take swift action to get its house in order.’”). 
187 See LORNA ADAMS, AOIFE NI LUANAIGH, DOMINIC THOMSON & HELEN ROSSITER, 
EQUAL. & HUM. RTS. COMM’N, RESEARCH REPORT 117, MEASURING AND REPORTING ON 
DISABILITY AND ETHNICITY PAY GAPS 23-45 (2018), https://www.equalityhumanrights.com 
/sites/default/files/measuring-and-reporting-on-ethnicity-and-disability-pay-gaps.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4HWL-54NZ]. 
188 See Cassie Werber, 15 UK Companies Have Volunteered to Report Their Ethnicity Pay 
Gaps, QUARTZ AT WORK (Feb. 28, 2019), https://qz.com/work/1562321/15-uk-companies-
will-report-their-ethnicity-pay-gaps/ [https://perma.cc/4DJA-ET9L]. 
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While such global efforts may provide the best models for a U.S. federal law, 
some U.S. states have started to legislate in this area. To date, at least sixteen 
states have enacted pay transparency laws that prohibit employers from 
penalizing employees from sharing or inquiring about pay.189 Notably, the 
federal National Labor Relations Act also protects covered employees in this 
matter.190 At least seventeen states have also banned employers from asking job 
applicants about their prior salaries, which aims to improve pay equity in starting 
salaries.191 Yet only three states have enacted salary-information-disclosure 
laws, all aimed at individual applicants. Colorado192 requires job postings to 
disclose pay range and benefits; California193 and Washington194 require an 
employer to provide information on pay scale for a position offered upon the 
employee’s request.  
Lastly, New York has introduced195 and California has recently enacted196 
legislation requiring more comprehensive pay data disclosure to state regulators. 
The California law, enacted in October 2020 and taking effect in March 2021, 
requires private employers of 100 or more employees—that are already 
 
189 See Equal Pay and Pay Transparency Protections, U.S. DEP’T LAB. WOMEN’S BUREAU, 
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/wb/equal-pay-protections [https://perma.cc/5QGD-4ZY6] 
(last visited Dec. 28, 2020) (providing that state pay-transparency protections are available 
for employees in California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, 
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Vermont, 
and Washington, D.C.). 
190 See National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, §§ 7-8, 49 Stat. 449, 
452-53 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-158(a)). 
191 See Your Guide to Salary History Laws by State and Locality, SALARY.COM, 
https://www.salary.com/resources/guides/salary-history-inquiry-bans/ 
[https://perma.cc/5HP9-NCCK] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020) (listing seventeen “state-wide 
salary history bans”); e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.3 (West 2020); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 112 
(2019); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 194-a (McKinney 2020). 
192 S.B. 19-085, 72nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2019); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-5-
201(2) (eff. Jan. 1, 2021). 
193 LAB. § 432.3(c) (“An employer, upon reasonable request, shall provide the pay scale 
for a position to an applicant applying for employment. For purposes of this section, ‘pay 
scale’ means a salary or hourly wage range. For purposes of this section ‘reasonable request’ 
means a request made after an applicant has completed an initial interview with the 
employer.”). 
194 WASH. REV. CODE § 49.58.110(1) (2020) (“Upon request of an applicant for 
employment after the employer has initially offered the applicant the position, the employer 
must provide the minimum wage or salary for the position for which the applicant is 
applying.”). 
195 S.B. S4065, 2019-2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019). In addition, a separate bill has 
been introduced to track pay data among New York state contractors. S.B. S1482, 2019-2020 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019). 
196 S.B. 973, 2019-2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2020). 
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compelled to provide some data to federal agencies197—to provide pay data by 
sex, race, and ethnicity in ten occupational categories to the state fair 
employment practices agency, which can make reports available to the state 
labor department when requested.198 While data is not made public generally, 
the state agencies may, but are not required to, “develop, publish, . . . and 
publicize aggregate reports based on the data obtained . . . , provided that the 
aggregate reports are reasonably calculated to prevent the association of any data 
with any individual business or person.”199 New York’s proposed bill includes 
similar provisions.200 
Thus, looking at a variety of international models and early movement in the 
states provides a rich background to support federal efforts around meaningful 
pay data collection. 
2. Requiring Pay-Data Disclosures in U.S. Law 
At the federal level, some limited data collection has been required of larger 
companies and those receiving federal contracts for decades. Since 1966, just 
after the enactment of Title VII, federal law has required certain employers to 
disclose basic data on employees by gender, race, and job category through its 
Standard Form 100 or Employer Information Report EEO-1 (“EEO-1”).201 The 
relevant section of Title VII states that every employer or entity subject to the 
statute “[s]hall . . . make and keep such records relevant to the determinations of 
whether unlawful employment practices have been or are being 
committed . . . and . . . make such reports therefrom as the Commission shall 
prescribe by regulation or order . . . as reasonable, necessary, or appropriate for 
the enforcement of [Title VII].”202  
Under the implementing regulations to this section, the EEOC is authorized 
to collect EEO-1 forms from all private employers with 100 or more 
employees.203 Under Executive Order 11,246, the Office of Federal Contract 
Compliance Programs (“OFCCP”) is authorized to collect EEO-1 forms from 
all private federal contractors with fifty or more employees that receive federal 
 
197 The California law applies to “a private employer that has 100 or more employees and 
who is required to file an annual Employer Information Report (EEO-1) pursuant to federal 
law.” Id. § 3(a). Federal EEO-1 reports are discussed in the next section. See infra notes 201-
09 and accompanying text. 
198 Cal. S.B. 973, § 3. 
199 Id. § 3(k); see also Pay Data Reporting, CAL. DEP’T FAIR EMP. & HOUS., 
https://www.dfeh.ca.gov/paydatareporting [https://perma.cc/JCQ9-T8QG] (last updated Nov. 
23, 2020). 
200 N.Y. S.B. S4065, § 1. 
201 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1602.7-.14 (2020); EEO-1: Who Must File, 
EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/employers/eeo-1-survey/eeo-1-who-must-file 
[https://perma.cc/36DY-7EYJ] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020). 
202 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c). 
203 29 C.F.R. § 1602.7. 
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contracts worth $50,000 or more.204 Covered entities must complete the form 
annually, providing a snapshot of racial and gender demographics of the 
workforce and identifying the gender (male or female) and race (from seven 
categories)205 of employees in ten different job types.206 The two agencies use 
this information internally to track compliance, inform investigations, and create 
periodic aggregated public reports about trends in workforce demographics.207 
Parties to litigation may seek to discover EEO-1 reports and use them either 
offensively (employees) or defensively (employers) to support or defend against 
claims of discrimination.208 In addition, for federal contractors, the OFCCP 
conducts periodic “compliance evaluations,” in which it can request “up-to-date, 
employee-level pay data from contractors,” which “enables OFCCP to identify 
disparities in pay that may violate Executive Order 11,246 by comparing the pay 
of employees who are similarly situated under the contractors’ pay practices.”209 
Given the persistence of gender and racial pay gaps, after several years of 
considering the option, in 2016, the EEOC under the Obama Administration 
used its regulatory authority210 to expand data collected on the EEO-1 as a means 
 
204 Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. § 339 (1965); 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.7 (2019); see also 
Pamela Wolf, OFCCP Does Not Want Any EEO-1 Pay Data, WOLTERS KLUWER (Nov. 25, 
2019), https://lrus.wolterskluwer.com/news/employment-law-daily/ofccp-does-not-want-any 
-eeo-1-pay-data/99960/ [https://perma.cc/TX89-X78D]. 
205 The seven racial categories are Hispanic or Latino, White, Black or African American, 
Asian, Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander, American Indian or Alaskan Native, or 
Two or more races. See EEOC, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY: EMPLOYER INFORMATION 
REPORT EEO—1 (2006) [hereinafter SAMPLE EEO-1], https://www.eeoc.gov/sites/default 
/files/migrated_files/employers/eeo1survey/eeo1-2-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/7CY3-7FMK]; 
see also EEO-1 Instruction Booklet, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/employers/eeo1survey 
/2007instructions.cfm [https://perma.cc/83US-2Q6F] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020). 
206 These ten job types are Executive/Senior Level Officials and Managers, First/Mid-
Level Officials and Managers, Professionals, Technicians, Sales Workers, Administrative 
Support Workers, Craft Workers, Operatives, Laborers and Helpers, and Service Workers. 
SAMPLE EEO-1, supra note 205; see also EEO-1 Instruction Booklet, supra note 205. 
207 Robert W. Sikkel, What EEO-1 Reports Really Tell Us, PRAC. LITIGATOR, Sept. 2004, 
at 17; see also, e.g., EEOC, CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIVATE SECTOR EMPLOYMENT (2003), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/sites/default/files/migrated_files/eeoc/statistics/reports/ceosummit/ch
aracteristics.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8ZN-ZM95]. In fact, the statute requires that individual 
data be kept confidential. See infra notes 226-31 and accompanying text. 
208 Sikkel, supra note 207, at 20-22. 
209 Intention Not To Request, Accept, or Use Employer Information Report (EEO–1) 
Component 2 Data, 84 Fed. Reg. 64,932, 64,933 (Nov. 25, 2019) (noting also that “OFCCP 
will continue to receive EEO–1 Component 1 data from covered contractors and 
subcontractors through the Joint Reporting Committee for purposes of reviewing their 
compliance with Executive Order 11246 and its implementing regulations, including the 
reporting requirements at 41 CFR 60–1.7”); see also Wolf, supra 204. 
210 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1602.11 (2020) (“The Commission 
reserves the right to require reports, other than that designated as the Employer Information 
Report EEO–1, about the employment practices of individual employers or groups of 
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of improving enforcement efforts.211 The EEOC held formal public hearings212 
and then went through the Notice and Comment process to amend the form, 
explaining, 
[P]ay discrimination persists as a serious problem that EEOC and OFCCP 
are statutorily required to address. The EEOC’s mission is to stop and 
remedy unlawful employment discrimination. . . . [The agencies] now lack 
the employer- and establishment-specific pay data that, prior to issuing a 
detailed request for information or a subpoena, would be extremely useful 
in helping enforcement staff to investigate potential pay discrimination. 
Balancing utility and burden, the EEOC has concluded that the proposed 
EEO–1 pay data collection would be an effective and appropriate tool for 
this purpose . . . .  
 Using aggregated EEO–1 data, . . . the EEOC expects to periodically 
publish reports on pay disparities by race, sex, industry, [and] occupational 
groupings . . . .  
 The EEOC’s publication of aggregated pay data, in conjunction with the 
employer’s preparation of the EEO–1 report itself, may be useful tools for 
employers to engage in voluntary self-assessment of pay practices.213 
As required under the Paperwork Reduction Act (“PRA”), the EEOC sought, 
and was granted, permission from the Office of Management and Budget 
(“OMB”) to revise the standard EEO-1 form to add fields collecting summary 
pay data.214 This data was referred to as “Component 2” data, while the 
 
employers whenever, in its judgment, special or supplemental reports are necessary to 
accomplish the purposes of title VII . . . .”). 
211 The Obama Administration also sought to expand pay transparency among federal 
contractors through two Executive Orders. First, Executive Order 13,665, which remains in 
effect, prohibits most federal contractors receiving $10,000 or more from firing or penalizing 
any applicant or employee for “inquir[ing] about, discuss[ing], or disclos[ing]” their or others’ 
pay. Exec. Order No. 13,665, 79 Fed. Reg. 20,749, 20,749 (Apr. 11, 2014). Second, Executive 
Order 13,673 required that any entity receiving a federal contract for over $500,000 provide 
regular wage statements to workers and disclose any resolutions against them under Title VII 
or other labor laws in the prior three years; it also barred any contracts in excess of $1 million 
from requiring arbitration of Title VII claims or tort claims for sexual harassment or assault 
without voluntary consent by the claimant. Exec. Order No. 13,673, 79 Fed. Reg. 45,309, 
45,309-14 (Aug. 5, 2014). Upon taking office, President Trump issued his own Executive 
Order 13,782, which revoked these provisions of Executive Order 13,673. Exec. Order No. 
13,782, 82 Fed. Reg. 15,607, 15,607 (Mar. 30, 2017). 
212 See, e.g., Hearing of March 16, 2016 - Public Input into the Proposed Revisions to the 
EEO-1 Report, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/meetings/hearing-march-16-2016-public-input 
-proposed-revisions-eeo-1-report [https://perma.cc/6MGD-3YLA] (last visited Dec. 28, 
2020). 
213 Agency Information Collection Activities; Notice of Submission for OMB Review, 
Final Comment Request: Revision of the Employer Information Report (EEO–1), 81 Fed. 
Reg. 45,479, 45,483, 45,491 (July 14, 2016). 
214 See id. at 45,492. 
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traditional EEO-1 data collected on jobs by race and sex without pay information 
was referred to as “Component 1” data.215 To collect Component 2 information, 
the EEO-1 form was revised in two ways. First, where employers already 
provided racial and gender data on employees in each of eleven job categories, 
it subdivided those listed in each category by pay, requiring each employee to 
be listed in one of twelve pay bands ranging from “$19,239 and under” to 
“$208,000 and over.”216 Second, using the same pay bands, job categories, and 
racial categories, it required employers to report work hours.217 Thus without 
dramatically revising the form, it added a granular detail on both pay and work 
hours. In September 2016, the OMB approved the change, and the Component 
2 addition to the EEO-1 reporting was set to take effect for reporting years 2017 
and 2018.218 
However, with the change in presidential administration came changes at both 
the OMB and the EEOC. In August 2017, the Trump Administration’s OMB 
issued a stay of the collection of Component 2 data, claiming that it was 
“concerned that some aspects of the revised collection of information lack 
practical utility, are unnecessarily burdensome, and do not adequately address 
privacy and confidentiality issues.”219 In response, the National Women’s Law 
Center (“NWLC”) sued to enforce the properly enacted regulation, arguing that, 
by imposing the stay, the “OMB . . . violated the PRA and Administrative 
Procedure Act (“APA”) and exceeded their statutory authority.”220 The District 
Court for the District of Columbia agreed, finding that the OMB’s justification 
“rest[ed] on hyper-technical formatting changes that have no real consequences 
for employers”221 and thus “provided inadequate reasoning to support its 
decision to stay the data collection.”222 In March 2019, the District Court vacated 
 
215 Id. 
216 The twelve pay bands were $19,239 and under, $19,240 - $24,439, $24,440 - $30,679, 
$30,680 - $38,999, $39,000 - $49,919, $49,920 - $62,919, $62,920 - $80,079, $80,080 - 
$101,919, $101,920 - $128,959, $128,960 - $163,799, $163,800 - $207,999, and $208,000 
and over. FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, COMPONENT 2 EEO-1 ONLINE FILING SYSTEM SAMPLE 
FORM 1, https://www.foley.com/-/media/files/firm/comp2eeo1onlinefilingsampleform.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3MF9-A7UF] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020). 
217 Id.; see also Jeffery S. Kopp, Very Important Time-Sensitive New Requirements for 
EEO-1 Component 2 Filings, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP (July 26, 2019), https://www.foley.com 
/en/insights/publications/2019/07/very-important-time-sensitive-eeo1-component-2 
[https://perma.cc/9ESN-REG4]. 
218 Press Release, EEOC, EEOC to Collect Summary Pay Data (Sep. 29, 2016), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/newsroom/eeoc-collect-summary-pay-data [https://perma.cc/7LTP-
SP5E]. 
219 Nat’l Women’s L. Ctr. v. Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, 358 F. Supp. 3d 66, 74-75 (D.D.C. 
2019) (citing Memorandum from Neomi Rao, Adm’r, Off. of Info. & Regul. Affs., to Victoria 
Lipnic, Acting Chair, Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n (Aug. 29, 2017)). 
220 Id. at 76. 
221 Id. at 92. 
222 Id. at 90. 
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the OMB’s stay of the enacted regulation.223 In a subsequent order on April 25, 
2019 granting injunctive relief, the court held “that EEOC must immediately 
take all steps necessary to complete the EEO-1 Component 2 data collections 
for calendar years 2017 and 2018 by September 30, 2019”224—a task not 
“deemed complete . . . until the percentage of EEO-1 reporters that have 
submitted their EEO-1 Component 2 reports equals or exceeds the mean 
percentage of EEO-1 reporters that . . . submitted EEO-1 reports in each of the 
past four reporting years.”225 
The Trump Administration appealed226 but also, in July 2019, began 
collecting 2017 and 2018 Component 2 data per the court order,227 hiring the 
National Opinion Research Center (“NORC”) at the University of Chicago to 
help do so.228 Yet the victory was short lived. In September 2019, the EEOC 
announced that it would not extend Component 2 data collection past the two 
years of data covered by the 2016 regulation, and it sought renewal of collection 
of Component 1 data only.229 As it had in its defense against the NWLC lawsuit, 
the Administration cited costs, stating that, in March 2019, new data staff at the 
EEOC “re-examined the methodology used to calculate the . . . burden for the 
collection of EEO–1 data” and concluded that the 2016 EEOC staff 
underestimated the cost significantly.230 Moreover, in November 2019, the 
 
223 Id. at 93. 
224 Order at 1, Nat’l Women’s L. Ctr., 358 F. Supp. 3d 66 (No. 17-cv-2458) [hereinafter 
Apr. 2019 Order]. 
225 Id. at 2; see also Agency Information Collection Activities; Notice of Submission for 
OMB Review, Final Comment Request: Revision of the Employer Information Report (EEO–
1), 81 Fed. Reg. 45,479, 45,483-89 (July 14, 2016). 
226 Nat’l Women’s L. Ctr. v. Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, No. 19-5130, 2020 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 18144 (D.C. Cir. June 9, 2020). The appeal was granted in part and dismissed as moot 
based on the parties agreement that the government “substantially complied with the district 
court’s post-judgment orders.” Id. 
227 Reinstatement of Revised EEO–1: Pay Data Collection, 84 Fed. Reg. 18,383 (May 1, 
2019); see also Lisa Nagele-Piazza, Employers Must Submit EEO-1 Pay Data by Sept. 30, 
SHRM (Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/legal-and-compliance 
/employment-law/pages/eeo-1-report-hearing.aspx [https://perma.cc/E96Q-ZNYC]. 
228 Press Release, EEOC, EEOC Opens Calendar Years 2017 and 2018 Pay Data 
Collection (July 15, 2019), https://www.eeoc.gov/newsroom/eeoc-opens-calendar-years-
2017-and-2018-pay-data-collection [https://perma.cc/KNT5-RXLS]. 
229 Agency Information Collection Activities: Existing Collection, 84 Fed. Reg. 48,138, 
48,138 (Sept. 12, 2019). 
230 Id. at 48,138-40. These were shockingly different figures, with the Obama EEOC 
estimating $54 million total in costs to business for data collection for 2017 and 2018 
combined, and the Trump EEOC estimating $614 million in 2017 and $622 million in 2018—
a difference of nearly $1.2 billion. What You Should Know About EEOC and the Publication 
of the Notice of Information Collection Regarding the EEO-1., EEOC [hereinafter EEO-1 
Collection Information], https://www.eeoc.gov/wysk/what-you-should-know-about-eeoc-
and-publication-notice-information-collection-regarding-eeo-1 [https://perma.cc/D5QZ-
XQ8Z] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020). 
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OFCCP announced that it would not collect EEO-1 Component 2 data from 
federal contractors at all;231 because Executive Order 11,246—not Title VII—
provides the OFCCP with its EEO-1 authority, the OFCCP was not required to 
comply with the court’s order.232 
Then, on February 10, 2020, a mere seven months after first opening its portal 
to collect EEO-1 Component 2 data, the Trump Administration went back to the 
D.C. District Court to argue that it had met the terms of the court’s April 25, 
2019 order.233 In a joint status report, the parties stated that 89.2% of all covered 
private employers had submitted their Component 2 pay data for 2017 and 
2018,234 thus meeting the condition for completion that the court had set to meet 
their duties under the reinstated 2016 regulation.235 This condition satisfied, the 
court granted the order holding that the collection was complete.236 Immediately 
the EEOC announced that it would be ending Component 2 data collection and 
shutting down the portal within a matter of days.237 
As this history shows, the mechanism to create and enforce a mandatory pay-
data reporting requirement in U.S. federal law already exists and can be utilized. 
Indeed, the state law recently enacted in California was explicitly modeled on 
the federal effort to collect EEO-1 Component 2 data,238 meaning that all 
covered employers in California will already have to compile this information 
starting in March 2021. And despite the Trump Administration’s arguments to 
the contrary, 90% of the 60,000 covered employers nationwide were able to 
comply despite any anticipated costs in as little as seven months.239 As one 
attorney for the plaintiffs said, “The [Trump] administration said it was too 
burdensome for employers to collect equal pay data, and we proved them 
wrong.”240 At a minimum, the data collection already established under 
 
231 Intention Not to Request, Accept, or Use Employer Information Report (EEO–1) 
Component 2 Data, 84 Fed. Reg. 64,932, 64,933 (Nov. 25, 2019); see also Wolf, supra note 
204. 
232 Wolf, supra note 204. 
233 Apr. 2019 Order, supra note 224. 
234 Joint Status Report at 1, Nat’l Women’s L. Ctr. v. Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, 358 F. 
Supp. 3d 66 (D.D.C. 2019) (No. 17-cv-02458). 
235 Apr. 2019 Order, supra note 224, at 1-2; see also Adam Lidgett, Judge Accepts EEOC 
Request to Close Out Pay Data Survey, LAW360 (Feb. 10, 2020, 6:56 PM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1242409/judge-accepts-eeoc-request-to-close-out-pay-
data-survey. 
236 Feb. 2020 Order at 2, Nat’l Women’s L. Ctr., 358 F. Supp. 3d 66 (No. 17-cv-02458). 
237 2019 Component 1 EEO-1 Survey, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/employers/2019-
component-1-eeo-1-survey [https://perma.cc/8V8S-MU7J] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020). 
238 S.B. 973, 2019-2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1(d)-(e) (Cal. 2020) (discussing the Obama 
Administration’s EEO-1 expansion efforts, halted by the Trump Administration, and stating 
that “[i]t is the intent of the [California] Legislature, in enacting this bill, to ensure that this 
pay data will continue to be compiled and aggregated in California”).å 
239 Lidgett, supra note 235. 
240 Id. (alteration in original). 
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expanded Component 2 of EEO-1 should continue beyond the initial three-year 
requirement. Once the costs have been sunk and the processes established, there 
is simply no valid reason to stop pay-data collection. Indeed, any costs from 
startup would be amortized over a longer period of time, making it a better 
proposition for business entities.  
Should a new administration decide to reinstate the data collection for future 
years, the next step would be to consider whether greater data collection or 
publication would be warranted. The enforcement power of pay-data collection 
could be expanded in three ways. First, collection could be expanded to smaller 
employers—that is, those with fewer than 100 employees. While this would 
expose potentially unfair pay disparities occurring at a significantly larger 
number of U.S. employers, it is not without its costs. To require companies that 
have never before filed an EEO-1 to do so would impose an administrative 
burden on companies that may be less able to absorb the costs—a much greater 
burden than requiring current EEO-1 filers to simply provide more types of 
data.241 And the statistical significance of any conclusions drawn from pay 
patterns by race or sex may be impacted by sample size where an employer has 
fewer than 100 employees. Incrementally, then—and without seeing the effect 
of new data collection efforts on larger employers—it may strike a better balance 
not to extend mandatory EEO-1 data collection to smaller companies but to issue 
guidelines for their voluntary tracking and compliance.  
Second, EEO-1 filers could be required to provide greater analysis of their 
own data. Notably, while the U.S. regulation requires collection and production 
of raw data, some European data collection models, including the U.K. model, 
require employers to actually calculate the gender pay gap in their own 
institutions and provide a narrative report explaining their results.242 This would 
likely enhance the behavior-forcing effects of existing disclosure requirements 
by forcing employers to not only collect pay data but also actually confront the 
situation in their workplace and analyze any causes of gender and racial 
disparities.243 While doing so would impose additional costs on employers, it 
could provide greater compliance and data for enforcement to the EEOC at no 
additional public cost to the federal government. Importantly, any U.S. business 
with employees in the United Kingdom is already required to produce this data 
for their employees located there,244 posted on both the U.K. government’s and 
the company’s own websites. For example, Google, Facebook, Bank of 
America, American Airlines, and other large U.S businesses have already 
compiled reports for their U.K. employees.245 Yet to require data in a meaningful 
way that can be compared across companies, the EEOC would have to create 
 
241 See supra Section IV.A.1. 
242 See Overview, supra note 5. 
243 See supra Section II.A.2. 
244 UK Overview, supra note 171. 
245 See Search and Compare Gender Pay Gap Data, supra note 171. 
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and provide calculation instructions as the U.K. government has done. Also, the 
U.K. requirement applies to employers of 250 or more, which are likely more 
able to absorb the additional costs of the analysis. 
Third, and likely the least costly and most powerful means for expanding 
current EEO-1 requirements, would be to engage in greater public exposure of 
the data already being collected. Current EEO-1 reporting is provided only to 
the EEOC and is not published. With very little financial cost, the EEOC could 
make these reports publicly available online, for example, by creating a 
searchable database like that maintained in the United Kingdom. This would 
immediately enhance both the ability to correct for information asymmetry and 
the “publicness” values of pay-data disclosure,246 as current and future 
employees, journalists, attorneys, and the public could all see the data the EEOC 
receives. 
Yet, while there would be little financial cost to this expansion, this would 
require both a statutory change and a shift in employer expectations. A specific 
subsection of Title VII requires the EEOC to keep its compliance data, including 
EEO-1 forms, confidential; a violation of this provision is a criminal 
misdemeanor.247 The EEOC may share EEO-1 information publicly—for 
example, in response to a request under the Freedom of Information Act 
(“FOIA”)248—only after it institutes a “proceeding under Title VII involving the 
EEO-1 data.”249 The statute “allow[s] the EEOC to publish only aggregated data, 
and only in a manner that does not reveal any particular filer’s or any individual 
employee’s personal information.”250 As discussed further in Part IV, there 
would likely be significant opposition from the business community based on 
privacy concerns. Indeed, in its initial efforts to expand EEO-1 data collection 
to add Component 2 data, the Obama-era EEOC anticipated such concerns and 
stated that all collected data on the expanded EEO-1 would remain 
confidential.251 
Again, evidence of pay or promotion gaps by gender or race do not prove 
discrimination, as many legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons (differences in 
 
246 See supra Sections II.A.1, II.A.3. 
247 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(e) (prohibiting “any officer or employee of the Commission 
[from] mak[ing] public in any manner whatever any information obtained by the Commission 
pursuant to its authority . . . prior to the institution of any proceeding under this subchapter 
involving such information”); see also Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Associated Dry 
Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 590, 598 (1981); EEO-1 Instruction Booklet, supra note 205. 
248 See 5 U.S.C. § 552. 
249 See EEO-1 Instruction Booklet, supra note 205; accord Freedom of Information Act, 
EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/foia/index.cfm [https://perma.cc/3EWG-7Z87] (last 
visited Dec. 28, 2020). 
250 EEO-1 Instruction Booklet, supra note 205. 
251 Agency Information Collection Activities; Notice of Submission for OMB Review, 
Final Comment Request: Revision of the Employer Information Report (EEO–1), 81 Fed. 
Reg. 45,479, 45,491-92 (July 14, 2016); see also infra Section IV.B. 
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qualifications, experience, seniority, and the like) could explain disparities. As 
a result, publication of raw data without an explanatory analysis or narrative 
could lead to misinterpretation by the public. Yet while such data does not prove 
discrimination, it can help expose the structural causes of pay gaps, both at an 
individual employer level and on a societal level. An employer who, after being 
required to collect pay data, realizes that there are far more women in lower 
paying roles may reflect upon its pay-setting and promotion procedures and 
consider training and retention policies of lower-level employees. And a public 
which sees that, across all employers, certain job categories are much more 
heavily filled by racial minorities may gain the political will to tackle the causes 
of workforce job segregation. Short of publishing individual employer data 
under the U.K. model, the EEOC could publish more aggregated data by 
industry or employer type as a first step in this process.  
B. Promotion Data to Break Through Glass Ceilings 
Closely related to the problem of persistent gender and racial pay gaps is the 
stall in progress to break through gender and racial glass ceilings. While many 
U.S. workplaces have diverse workforces overall, women and racial minorities 
are still significantly underrepresented in leadership positions within institutions 
and industries. Recent statistics show that little progress has been made since the 
enactment of Title VII in diversifying top leadership. For example, among 
Fortune 500 companies, only 1% of CEOs are Black, 2% are Latinx, and 5% are 
women.252 Additionally, women lead only 167 of the top 3,000 businesses, just 
over 5.5%.253 Studies have also documented that those who do make it to CEO 
face a “glass cliff” followed by a “savior effect”: women and racial minorities 
are more likely to be promoted to CEO of weak performing firms and then 
replaced by White men if their performance slips.254 Diversity is lacking not just 
in top leadership positions but also in the middle and upper-middle levels of 
leadership that pave the way to top positions. Among the Fortune 500, “[o]nly 
 
252 Where’s the Diversity in Fortune 500 CEOs?, DIVERSITYINC (Oct. 8, 2012), 
https://www.diversityinc.com/wheres-the-diversity-in-fortune-500-ceos/ [https://perma.cc 
/NYU4-KBND]; see also Te-Ping Chen, Why Are There Still So Few Black CEOs?, WALL 
ST. J. (Sept. 28, 2020, 10:16 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-are-there-still-so-few-
black-ceos-11601302601 (noting that Black professionals make up only 1% of executive 
positions in the top 500 companies, with Black women having least representation). 
253 Vanessa Fuhrmans, Where Are All the Women CEOs?, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 6, 2020, 10:34 
AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-so-few-ceos-are-women-you-can-have-a-seat-at-
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254 See generally Alison Cook & Christy Glass, Above the Glass Ceiling: When Are 
Women and Racial/Ethnic Minorities Promoted to CEO?, 35 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1080, 
1081-82 (2014). 
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22 percent of senior vice presidents are women . . . [and w]omen are 18 percent 
less likely to be promoted to manager than their male peers.”255 
Outside of the business sector, these patterns remain consistent, particularly 
in other traditionally white-collar, higher-paying fields. For example, despite 
earning 59% of all master’s degrees—and many professional degrees, such as 
48.5% in law and 47.5% in medicine—and despite holding nearly 52% of all 
managerial and professional jobs, women hold only about 10-20% of leadership 
positions, such as law firm equity partnerships, medical school deanships, or 
senior management positions in S&P 1500 companies.256 Statistics also show a 
profound racial glass ceiling—only three of the Fortune 500 CEOs are Black,257 
and corporate leadership remains even less diverse than corporate board 
membership.258 This doubly impacts women of color, who compose more than 
18% of the U.S. workforce and employees of S&P 500 companies, yet hold just 
4.7% of senior management positions in the S&P 500 and 0.4% (two) of CEO 
positions in the Fortune 500.259 
While statistics alone do not prove discrimination, the repeated patterns of 
statistical overrepresentation by women and racial minorities in lower-level 
positions and underrepresentation in higher-level positions demonstrate 
systemic problems that remain nearly sixty years after Title VII was passed. As 
with pay data, requiring employers to track and analyze their own patterns of 
promotion and leadership can help identify structural causes of such disparities, 
whether due to, for example, lack of training or mentoring opportunities, flawed 
systems for assigning work or making promotion decisions, or the operation of 
unexamined bias. 
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1. Current Comparative Examples 
As with collection of pay data, and inspired by a lack of women and people 
of color in leadership positions throughout the world,260 international and U.S. 
state-level public policies provide models for tracking gender and racial 
diversity in leadership upon which U.S. federal law could be based. Again, 
existing efforts range from a light to a strong touch, with some governments 
inferring leadership data from pay scale data, others requiring disclosures on 
corporate leadership, and some mandating diversity from firms, for example, in 
their board membership.261  
On the lighter touch side of the spectrum, the United Kingdom’s pay-data 
disclosures provide data by pay-band ranges that can be used to infer data about 
diversity in organizational leadership.262 For example, in its 2018 disclosures to 
comply with the U.K. pay-data directive, Google was forced to report the gender 
makeup of employees in each of four quartiles of earnings.263 The pay-gap 
disclosure showed a lack of gender diversity in leadership and promotional 
opportunities.264 Further, over half of Google’s lowest-paid employees were 
women, and the proportion of women in each quartile of earnings steadily 
declined as pay rose: women were 51% of employees in the lowest-paid quartile, 
38% of the lower middle, 24% of the upper middle, and only 21% of the 
highest.265  
Because U.K. law requires a narrative analysis to accompany the report, 
Google itself recognized the possibility of a gender glass ceiling in its 
operations, noting that, while it had “no statistically significant pay 
differences . . . based on gender, when accounting for role, performance and 
other factors,” its roughly 20% pay gap between men and women “is driven by 
a representation gap”266 in higher paid positions. As the report explained, 
 The underrepresentation of women in senior leadership and engineering 
roles is a global and long term challenge, and we are committed to 
addressing this. The data for this report reflects representation as of April 
 
260 See, e.g., The Glass-Ceiling Index: The Latest Data Suggest Progress for Women at 
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2018. Since then, we’ve added dedicated staffing teams to focus on senior 
engagement and hiring, as well as launched inclusive hiring guidelines to 
support those involved in the process. 
 . . . .  
 And because we know that hiring alone isn’t enough, we’ve launched 
new retention initiatives, including a sponsorship programme that pairs 
high-potential women directors with vice presidents who provide coaching 
and advocacy to advance their careers. 
 . . . .  
 Over the past year, we’ve begun sharing ownership for our diversity, 
equity, and inclusion goals with our most senior leaders in order to 
accelerate progress.267  
Google’s reaction demonstrates that simply collecting pay data by quartile is 
enough to provide information on demographics in leadership and to inspire 
greater efforts toward promotion of diverse candidates. 
Relatedly, other countries have taken a much stronger approach to 
diversifying corporate boards. Since 2002, when Norway became the first, at 
least fifteen countries have enacted laws requiring specific diverse membership 
on boards of publicly traded corporations.268 These so-called “gender quota” 
laws range from requiring one female board member, like in the UAE and India, 
to a full 50% female membership, like in Israel, Greenland, and Quebec, with 
most countries in the 30-40% range.269 Consequences for failing to comply range 
from none to fees; denial of public contracts; refusal to register the board; or 
even, as in Norway, dissolving the company.270 
At the U.S. state level, one state, California, enacted a similar law in 2018, 
which it expanded in 2020. The Act requires all publicly held corporations 
“whose principal executive offices . . . are located in California”271 to have a 
minimum of one female member of its board of directors by the end of 2019; by 
the end of 2021, boards of five or more members must raise this to two and six 
or more members to three female directors.272 Corporations that fail to comply 
may be fined $100,000 for a first violation and $300,000 for any subsequent 
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268 See Siri Terjesen & Ruth Sealy, Board Gender Quotas: Exploring Ethical Tensions 
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272 Id. § 301.3(f) (defining “Female” as “an individual who self-identifies her gender as a 
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stock exchange”). 
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violation.273 Interestingly, the requirement is coupled with public disclosure by 
the California Secretary of State, who “shall publish a report on its Internet Web 
site” detailing the number of corporations covered, the number in compliance, 
and the number that either moved in or out of compliance or went private.274 In 
2020, California expanded the law to require that, by 2022, corporations have 
between one and three directors, depending on total board size, “from an 
underrepresented community,” defined as “an individual who self-identifies as 
Black, African American, Hispanic, Latino, Asian, Pacific Islander, Native 
American, Native Hawaiian, or Alaska Native, or . . . as gay, lesbian, bisexual, 
or transgender.”275 
Mandating board diversity is not the same as mandating diverse employee 
promotions, which would violate Title VII.276 Mandating board diversity also 
does not necessarily translate to leadership diversity: one study of the richest 
100 companies showed that the ten with the most diverse corporate boards (45% 
to 69% of members were women and/or racial minorities) had far less diverse 
executive-level employees (only 16% to 46%).277 The remaining ninety firms—
90% of the companies in the study—had fewer than 16% of executives who were 
women and/or racial minorities.278 While studies document a correlation 
between more diverse corporate board membership and more diverse hiring 
overall,279 tracking data on those holding corporate management positions 
would be a more direct approach to overcoming gender and racial glass ceilings.  
Lastly, in a similar vein, a 2014 European Union (“EU”) directive that applies 
to the EU’s twenty-seven member nations required publicly held corporations to 
disclose nonfinancial information on a variety of social, labor, and 
environmental topics, including “treatment of employees” and “diversity on 
company boards (in terms of age, gender, educational and professional 
background).”280 Similar to U.S. securities regulation, this directive applies to 
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large publicly held corporations based in the EU. And while the directive 
requires disclosure of any diversity policy, it does not require one to be created, 
so long as an explanation is provided.281  
2. Requiring Diversity-of-Leadership Disclosures in U.S. Law 
As with pay data, imposing a federal mandatory-public-disclosure 
requirement on gender and racial makeup of leadership would be an incremental 
change, building upon structures that already exist. As described previously, at 
the U.S. federal level, existing EEO-1 requirements mandate that employers of 
100 or more and federal contractors of fifty or more provide racial and gender 
data on their workers in ten different job categories.282 The job category for 
officials and managers is subdivided into executive/senior and first/midlevel.283 
While it lasted, Component 2 data added twelve pay bands within each of these 
categories.284  
In addition, while no U.S. federal law requires corporate board diversity, 
federal securities law has begun to consider diversity measures. In 2009, the 
SEC added a requirement that covered entities disclose “whether, and if so how, 
a nominating committee considers diversity in identifying nominees for 
director.”285 The SEC has recently interpreted this disclosure to include a 
description of “the self-identified diversity characteristics . . . (e.g., race, gender, 
ethnicity, religion, nationality, disability, sexual orientation, or cultural 
background)” considered in making a board appointment and the role those 
characteristics played in the process.286 
As with pay data, then, the easiest option at the federal level for expanding 
data collection on race and gender inequality in leadership would be to reinstate 
collection of Component 2 pay data, which would at least show pay quartile by 
gender and race. Propensity to be promoted across racial and gender lines can 
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such as, for instance, age, gender or educational and professional backgrounds should apply 
only to certain large undertakings. Disclosure of the diversity policy should be part of the 
corporate governance statement . . . . If no diversity policy is applied there should not be any 
obligation to put one in place, but the corporate governance statement should include a clear 
explanation as to why this is the case.”). 
282 See supra notes 201-09 and accompanying text. 
283 See supra note 206 and accompanying text. 
284 See supra notes 210-17 and accompanying text. 
285 Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, Securities Act Release No. 9089, Exchange Act 
Release No. 61,175, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,092, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 
68,343 (Dec. 23, 2009). 
286 Regulation S-K: Questions and Answers of General Applicability, SEC, 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/regs-kinterp.htm [https://perma.cc/Z6T9-
S5LA] (last updated Sept. 21, 2020). 
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be inferred from this information. It is possible that the combination of these two 
items could paint a useful picture of glass ceiling effects by race and gender. In 
the future, even more specific information could be added to the EEO-1 form—
for example, a column identifying the leadership roles within each of the ten job 
categories. But, this would require another revision to the EEO-1. These changes 
would have to be designed to avoid redundancy, as two of the ten job categories 
encompass managers and officers already.287 Another option would be to expand 
financial disclosure requirements on these topics to the SEC, but, for reasons 
discussed in Section III.C below, the EEOC is better equipped to use the 
collected data to recognize race and gender inequality that may be 
discriminatory. 
While California has gone so far as to mandate corporate board diversity, a 
requirement of the sort would be unlikely at the federal level as anything 
perceived to be a sex or race “quota” generally lacks legislative support.288 
Indeed, the Pacific Legal Foundation filed a lawsuit against the Secretary of 
State of California alleging that the 2018 law is unconstitutional sex 
discrimination against men and seeking to enjoin the law from taking effect.289  
C. Harassment Settlements to Expose and Change Cultures 
A final area in which U.S. antidiscrimination law efforts have stalled—as the 
#MeToo movement has made clear—is redressing harassment. As described 
previously, despite being illegal for decades, sexual harassment in the workplace 
is still shockingly common and dramatically underreported,290 and racial 
harassment charges to the EEOC have increased over the past decade.291  
 
287 See supra note 206 and accompanying text. 
288 Notably, federal contractors are required to comply with affirmative action mandates 
that encourage racial and gender diversity in hiring. Affirmative Action, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/hiring/affirmativeact [https://perma.cc/PC7X-WJCL] 
(last visited Dec. 28, 2020). These have been long established by Executive Order and are 
likely the cause of any pay and promotion equity among federal contractors. See Exec. Order 
11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (Sept. 28, 1965). Such measures, however, do not extend to 
private employers, for whom the law on affirmative action is different. A discussion of 
affirmative action in hiring is beyond this Article’s scope. 
289 The case was dismissed for lack of standing, a decision that the plaintiffs have appealed. 
Meland v. Padilla, No. 2:19-cv-02288, 2020 WL 1911545, at *4 (E.D. Cal. April 20, 2020), 
appeal docketed, No. 20-15762 (9th Cir. April 23, 2020); see also Kayla Epstein, This State 
Requires Company Boards to Include Women. A New Lawsuit Says That’s Unconstitutional., 
WASH. POST (Nov. 14, 2019, 5:49 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/11 
/14/this-state-requires-company-boards-include-women-new-lawsuit-says-thats-
unconstitutional/. 
290 See supra Sections I.C, II.B. 
291 Charges Alleging Race and Harassment (Charges Filed With EEOC) FY 1997 - FY 
2019, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/race_harassment.cfm 
[https://perma.cc/XT8M-RLQK] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020) (showing low of 5,600 charges 
filed in 2005 and high of 9,656 charges filed in 2016). 
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As this Article has established, because of the very nature of harassment, 
victims are afraid to come forward to complain—a fear compounded by fear of 
retaliation. And employers, fearing negative public exposure, are more likely to 
force harassment claims into private arbitration or require a nondisclosure 
agreement as part of a settlement. All of these factors—stigma, fear of 
retaliation, and confidentiality—create a perfect storm of stagnation in rooting 
out sexual harassment. While employers often view harassment as a “one bad 
apple” individual problem, the structural components that allow for a culture of 
harassment to persist remain unaddressed. For all of these reasons, public 
disclosure requirements may have the greatest effect in documenting harassment 
claims that end in settlement or arbitration.  
1. Current Comparative Examples 
While less common than pay data and diversity reporting requirements, a 
handful of international and state models for harassment disclosures exist, again 
providing a variety of approaches from which U.S. federal law could draw. 
Whereas the United States operates under a common-law system, many EU 
member nations are civil-law systems (for example, Germany, France, and 
Spain), in which the judge plays a larger investigatory role, and government 
agencies do more to resolve cases, which reduces the volume of private 
litigation.292 In the United Kingdom, the relevant equality commission has the 
power to investigate and order employer compliance itself.293 Thus the need for 
reporting confidential settlements in the EU and the United Kingdom may be far 
less than the need in the United States.  
There is no comprehensive EU directive on this topic, but some individual 
nations have developed their own reporting schemes. For example, government 
entities in both Sweden and Northern Ireland make public any discrimination 
settlements, including harassment settlements, in which the equality body is 
involved.294 In Northern Ireland, the Equality Commission maintains a public 
 
292 See ISABELLE CHOPIN & CATHARINA GERMAINE, EUR. COMM’N, A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS OF NON-DISCRIMINATION LAW IN EUROPE 84-94, 103-08 (2017), 
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/document.cfm?action=display&doc_id=49316 
[https://perma.cc/WGX6-GVB8]. 
293 Id. at 105 (“In the United Kingdom, both the British Equality and Human Rights 
Commission and the Equality Commission for Northern Ireland are able to use their powers 
of formal investigation to investigate organisations they believe to be discriminating and, 
where they are satisfied that unlawful acts have been committed, they can serve a binding 
‘compliance notice’ requiring the organisation to stop discriminating and to take action by 
specified dates to prevent discrimination from recurring. They also have the power to enter 
into (and to enforce via legal action if necessary) binding agreements with other bodies that 
undertake to avoid discriminatory acts and to seek an injunction to prevent someone 
committing an unlawful discriminatory act.” (emphasis omitted)). 
294 Alysia Blackham & Dominique Allen, Lifting the Curtain on Equality Law: The 
Emerging Importance of Transparency in Promoting Equality 7-8 (June 17, 2019) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Boston University Law Review) (citing 
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database of cases and settlements.295 The United Kingdom has begun to work 
toward legislation that would set limitations on confidentiality clauses in 
settlement agreements that seek to prevent disclosure of harassment and 
discrimination.296 
In the United States, at least fifteen states have enacted laws to ban or limit 
nondisclosure agreements of harassment claims.297 For example, California’s 
law, enacted in 2018, prohibits any “provision within a settlement agreement 
that prevents the disclosure of factual information” related to a civil claim or 
administrative complaint involving sexual assault or sexual harassment, 
“workplace harassment or discrimination based on sex” or a “failure to prevent” 
it, or “an act of retaliation against a person for reporting harassment or 
discrimination based on sex.”298 In addition, seven states have passed laws 
 
RIKSDAGSORDNINGEN [RO] [CONSTITUTION] (Swed.)) (noting that in Sweden, this is a product 
of the constitutionally guaranteed right to information from government bodies); see also 
Alysia Blackham, Positive Equality Duties: The Future of Equality and Transparency?, LAW 
IN CONTEXT (forthcoming 2021) (on file with the Boston University Law Review). 
295 Id. at 8; see also Case Decisions & Settlements, EQUAL. COMM. FOR N. IR., 
https://www.equalityni.org/cases [https://perma.cc/32LV-ZBVS] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020) 
(containing database of cases). 
296 Dominique Allen & Alysia Blackham, Under Wraps: Secrecy, Confidentiality and the 
Enforcement of Equality Law in Australia and the United Kingdom, 43 MELBOURNE UNIV. L. 
REV. 384, 419-21 (2019). See generally WOMEN & EQUALITIES COMMITTEE, THE USE OF NON-
DISCLOSURE AGREEMENTS IN DISCRIMINATION CASES: GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE 
COMMITTEE’S NINTH REPORT OF SESSION 2017–19, 2019, HC 215 (UK); DEP’T FOR BUS., 
ENERGY & INDUS. STRATEGY, CONFIDENTIALITY CLAUSES: RESPONSE TO THE GOVERNMENT 
CONSULTATION ON PROPOSALS TO PREVENT MISUSE IN SITUATIONS OF WORKPLACE 
HARASSMENT OR DISCRIMINATION. (2019), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk 
/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/818324/confidentiality-clause-
consultation-govt-response.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7NF-C9TY]. 
297 ANDREA JOHNSON, RAMYA SEKARAN & SASHA GOMBAR, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR., 
2020 PROGRESS UPDATE: METOO WORKPLACE REFORMS IN THE STATES 8-10 (2020), 
https://nwlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/v1_2020_nwlc2020States_Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9SVE-VELL] (describing such laws in Arizona, California, Hawaii, Illinois, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Tennessee, 
Vermont, Virginia, and Washington); Gena B. Usenheimer, Anne R. Dana, & Vlada Feldman, 
#MeToo Inspires Legislative Changes Across the United States, SEYFARTH (Mar. 28, 2019), 
https://www.seyfarth.com/news-insights/metoo-inspires-legislative-changes-across-the-
united-states.html [https://perma.cc/FS5Y-B6TK] (describing such laws in California, New 
Jersey, New York, Tennessee, Vermont, and Washington); see also Elizabeth C. Tippett, The 
Legal Implications of the MeToo Movement, 103 MINN. L. REV. 229, 249-58 (2018). 
298 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1001 (West 2020). Then-Governor Jerry Brown, citing 
Supreme Court precedent, vetoed a related measure that would have prohibited applicants or 
employees from being forced to waive their right to litigate discrimination charges as a 
condition of employment or continued employment. See A.B. 3080, 2017-2018 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Cal. 2018); AB-3080 Employment Discrimination: Enforcement, CA. LEGIS. INFO. 
(2018), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billStatusClient.xhtml?bill_id 
=201720180AB3080 [https://perma.cc/45QQ-NV8P] (providing status of bill and containing 
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limiting mandatory predispute arbitration agreements that include sexual 
harassment claims, although several are being challenged in federal court as 
violating the Federal Arbitration Act.299  
Two states have gone further, enacting affirmative reporting requirements of 
confidential settlements to a government agency. In 2018, as part of reforms to 
better redress sexual harassment, Maryland enacted a law that requires 
employers to disclose settlements of sexual harassment claims to its state fair 
employment agency.300 The law requires employers of fifty or more employees 
to submit a survey to the Maryland Commission on Civil Rights (“MCCR”) two 
separate times, on or before July 1, 2020 and July 1, 2022, when the provision 
sunsets.301 In the survey, the employer must report the number of settlements it 
has made to resolve a sexual harassment allegation, the number of times it paid 
a settlement against the same employee perpetrator in the prior ten years, and 
the number of such settlements that included a confidentiality provision.302 
Employers are allowed to detail in the survey any “personnel action” it took 
against the perpetrator employee.303 The law establishes that the MCCR “shall 
publish and make accessible to the public . . . on the Commission’s website” 
aggregate responses to the survey and create a report based on a random 
selection of surveys for the Governor “redacting any identifying information for 
specific employers.”304 However, the MCCR will also retain individual 
employer responses and make parts of them subject to public inspection upon 
request.305 
Likewise, in 2019, Illinois enacted a significant package of legislation to 
update and strengthen its laws against sexual harassment, including a settlement 
reporting requirement.306 Illinois’s disclosure requirements are even more 
comprehensive, including all discrimination claims. Starting July 1, 2020, 
employers of one or more must disclose to the Illinois Department of Human 
Rights (“IDHR”) on an annual basis any “adverse judgment or administrative 
ruling” in which there was a finding of unlawful discrimination, including sexual 
 
Governor’s veto message that “[t]his bill is based on a theory that the Act only governs the 
enforcement and not the initial formation of arbitration agreements and therefore California 
is free to prevent mandatory arbitration agreements from being formed at the outset. The 
Supreme Court has made it explicit this approach is impermissible”). 
299 JOHNSON, SEKARAN & GOMBAR, supra note 298, at 11-12 (describing such laws in 
California, Illinois, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Vermont, Washington, and legal 
challenges to the California, New Jersey, and New York laws). 
300 See H.B. 1596, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2018); S.B. 1010, Gen. Assemb., 
Reg. Sess. (Md. 2018). 
301 Md. H.B. 1596; Md. S.B. 1010.  
302 Md. H.B. 1596; Md. S.B. 1010. 
303 Md. H.B. 1596; Md. S.B. 1010. 
304 Md. H.B. 1596; Md. S.B. 1010. 
305 Md. H.B. 1596; Md. S.B. 1010. 
306 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-108 (2020). 
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harassment.307 The report must include the total number of adverse rulings under 
federal, state, or local law; any equitable relief that was ordered; and whether 
the claims involve sexual harassment or involve other discrimination on the 
basis of protected class.308 The Act also allows IDHR investigators to request 
and receive information on past settlements in the course of an investigation and 
requires the IDHR to publish an annual aggregated report without identification 
of any particular employer, the filings of which are confidential and not subject 
to FOIA laws.309  
2. Requiring Harassment-Settlement Disclosures in U.S. Law 
At the federal level, while it is not as directly applicable as the EEO-1 is to 
pay and promotion data collection, the federal government collects some data 
on harassment in the context of federally funded education. Under Title IX of 
the Education Amendments of 1972,310 all public and private educational 
institutions that receive federal funding must enforce prohibitions against sex 
discrimination, including sexual harassment and assault.311 In addition, Title VI 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964312 and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973313 require schools to prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, color, 
national origin, and disability. Federal laws and regulations authorize the 
Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights “to collect data that are 
necessary to ensure compliance with civil rights laws within [its] 
jurisdiction.”314 Since 1968, as part of this process, covered programs from early 
 
307 Id. 5/2-108(B). 
308 Id. Protected class bases tracked include sex; race, color, or national origin; religion; 
age; disability; military status; sexual orientation or gender identity; or other. Id. § 2-
108(B)(3). 
309 Id. 5/2-108(C)-(E). 
310 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688. 
311 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving 
Federal Financial Assistance, 34 C.F.R. § 106 (2020) 
312 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. 
313 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)). 
314 20 U.S.C. § 3413(c)(1); accord 34 C.F.R. § 100.6(b) (2019); id. § 104.61 (adopting 
procedural provisions applicable to Title VI to implement Section 504 of Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973); id. § 106.71 (adopting procedural provisions applicable to Title VI to implement 
Title IX of Education Amendments of 1972); Civil Rights Data Collection (CRDC): 
Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list 
/ocr/frontpage/faq/crdc.html#crdc [https://perma.cc /LM4E-T9CK] (last updated Jan. 10, 
2020) (“[The Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”)]’s implementing regulations for each of these 
statutes require recipients of the Department’s federal financial assistance to submit to OCR 
‘complete and accurate compliance reports at such times, and in such form and containing 
such information’ as OCR ‘may determine to be necessary to enable [OCR] to ascertain 
whether the recipient has complied or is complying’ with these laws and implementing 
regulations.” (second alteration in original) (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 100.6(b))). 
 
2021] DISCLOSING DISCRIMINATION 341 
 
education through the twelfth grade must complete the Civil Rights Data 
Collection survey every two years.315 The survey includes a requirement that 
each entity report on incidents of “harassment or bullying” on the basis of sex, 
race, color, national origin, or disability—including data on reported allegations, 
students who were victims, and students who were disciplined as perpetrators.316 
Data are published in a searchable database online.317 
In addition, under the Clery Act amendment to the Higher Education Act of 
1965, colleges and universities that receive federal funds must collect and 
produce data reports annually on campus crime, including sexual assault, 
domestic or dating violence, stalking, and crimes “in which the victim is 
intentionally selected because of the actual or perceived race, gender, religion, 
national origin, sexual orientation, gender identity, ethnicity, or disability of the 
victim.”318 Covered entities must collect and disseminate reports on crime 
statistics to their local communities and provide the report annually to the 
Secretary of Education.319  
In the past two legislative sessions, federal legislators have introduced bills in 
both chambers to expand reporting requirements under the Clery Act but without 
success to date. Both bills would require the Department of Education or the 
institutions themselves to publish online standardized, confidential, campus-
level results of periodic surveys of students on intimate partner violence, sexual 
assault, stalking, and/or sexual harassment to allow “students [to] make an 
informed choice when comparing universities.”320 They would also require the 
Department to “publish the names of all schools with pending investigations, 
final resolutions, and voluntary resolution agreements related to Title IX with 
respect to sexual violence.”321 
Other legislation proposed that the Census Bureau, the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, and the EEOC develop and conduct a “national prevalence survey on 
 
315 Civil Rights Data Collection (CRDC): Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 314. 
316 OFFICE FOR C.R., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 2017-18 CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION: LIST 
OF CRDC DATA ELEMENTS FOR SCHOOL YEAR 2017–18, at 3 (2018), https://www2.ed.gov 
/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/2017-18-crdc-data-elements.pdf [https://perma.cc/KYE5-E3V8]. 
317 Civil Rights Data Collection, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., https://ocrdata.ed.gov/ 
[https://perma.cc/SVG7-TNWC] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020). 
318 Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act, 
20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(1)(F)(ii) (footnote omitted). 
319 Id. § 1092(f)(3), (5). 
320 The Campus Accountability and Safety Act, KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, 
https://www.gillibrand.senate.gov/campus-sexual-assault [https://perma.cc/P8QE-Y43P] 
(last visited Dec. 28, 2020); see also HALT Campus Sexual Violence Act, H.R. 3381, 116th 
Cong. § 5 (2019) (requiring Department of Education to develop biennial sexual violence 
climate survey and requiring institutions to publish results online). 
321 The Campus Accountability and Safety Act, supra note 320; accord H.R. 3381, § 2 
(requiring Department of Education to publish online list of institutions under investigation 
and any sanctions, findings, or resolution agreements related to same). 
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the prevalence of prohibited harassment in employment” every three years to 
assess “beliefs, attitudes, and understanding of prohibited harassment in 
employment, and the extent to which such harassment is experienced or 
observed” in U.S. workplaces.322 The data would be disaggregated by protected 
class, subtypes of sex-based harassment, and “industry and salary level, 
including across all wage bands.”323 These bureaus and the EEOC would then 
“jointly prepare and submit . . . a report on the results of that survey” to 
Congress, and the report “shall [also] be made publicly available on the [three 
agencies’] websites.”324 
A number of legal scholars have also proposed,325 and federal legislators have 
introduced, bills that would limit or bar nondisclosure agreements or 
confidential settlements that include sexual harassment claims or discrimination 
claims on the basis of any protected class.326 Scholars have also argued in favor 
of barring mandatory arbitration of sexual harassment claims,327 and federal 
legislators proposed several bills that would do so as well.328 In lieu of 
legislation, legal scholars David Hoffman and Erik Lampmann have argued that 
 
322 BE HEARD in the Workplace Act, H.R. 2148, 116th Cong. § 111(a)-(b) (2019). 
323 Id. § 111(c)(2)(B). 
324 Id. § 111(c)(1), (c)(4). 
325 See, e.g., Vicki Schultz, Open Statement on Sexual Harassment from Employment 
Discrimination Law Scholars, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 17, 47-48 (2018) (“Federal and state 
law should restrict the use in standard employment contracts of broad nondisclosure 
agreements . . . in the context of settling an employee’s legal claims, enforcing them only 
where they meet certain requirements designed to permit disclosure of serial harassment or 
discrimination.”); Ian Ayres, Targeting Repeat Offender NDAs, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 76, 
79 (2018) (suggesting that some nondisclosure agreements should be subject to conditions 
and escrow requirements); Saul Levmore & Frank Fagan, Semi-Confidential Settlements in 
Civil, Criminal, and Sexual Assault Cases, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 311, 349-50 (2018) (arguing 
that limits on confidential agreements may encourage reporting and help reveal patterns of 
wrongdoing); Orly Lobel, NDAs Are Out of Control. Here’s What Needs to Change, HARV. 
BUS. REV. (Jan. 30, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/01/ndas-are-out-of-control-heres-what-needs-
to-change (“[E]fforts to ban secret settlements in the case of sexual harassment claims should 
be welcomed.”). 
326 H.R. 2148, § 302 (prohibiting employers from entering into contracts or agreements 
with workers that contain certain nondisparagement or nondisclosure clauses); EMPOWER 
Act, H.R. 1521, 116th Cong. § 103 (2019) (prohibiting inclusion in employment contracts of 
nondisparagement or nondisclosure clauses that cover workplace harassment based on any 
protected class, unless mutually agreed upon and beneficial to both employer and employee). 
327 See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 325, at 47; Erik Encarnacion, Discrimination, Mandatory 
Arbitration, and Courts, 108 GEO. L.J. 855, 899-904 (2020). 
328 See, e.g., H.R. 2148, § 303 (prohibiting predispute but allowing postdispute arbitration 
agreement if employee enters into it voluntarily without coercion and is informed in writing 
of rights and protections); Restoring Justice for Workers Act, S. 1491, 116th Cong. § 5 (2019) 
(same); Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act of 2019, H.R. 1443, 116th 
Cong. § 2 (2019) (prohibiting predispute arbitration agreements that require arbitration of sex 
discrimination disputes). 
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nondisclosure agreements that ban disclosure of sexual misconduct should be 
void under contract law as a violation of public policy.329  
Short of banning nondisclosure agreements entirely and moving closer to a 
public agency disclosure model, Ian Ayres has proposed that, if certain 
nondisclosure agreements are to be allowed, they should involve EEOC 
oversight.330 To be enforceable, Ayres suggests, a nondisclosure agreement must 
“explicitly describe the rights which the [employee] retains . . . to report the 
perpetrator’s behavior to the [EEOC],” it must require the perpetrator not to 
misrepresent any “past interactions” with the employee, and the employee’s 
allegations must be “deposited in an information escrow that would be released 
for investigation by the EEOC if another complaint is received against the same 
perpetrator.”331  
In a similar vein, Samuel Estreicher has proposed that the EEOC require 
employers to provide information on settlements with perpetrator identities 
protected so that, should a “pattern of repeated settlements emerge[],” the 
agency could intervene and investigate without the need for the employee to file 
a formal charge with the agency.332 If the EEOC decides to pursue the claim, it 
could then “obtain discovery of all claims of abuse involving the particular 
employee,” now seeking injunctive relief and substantial damages.333 (In 
contrast, Ayres’s proposals would allow identities to be released automatically 
for repeat offenders.334) Settlement information could be obtained, Estreicher 
suggests, through a simple add-on to data the EEOC already compels under its 
existing Title VII authority to collect reports like the EEO-1.335 This could be a 
“one-liner” addition to existing reports that avoids the Paperwork Reduction Act 
challenges faced by Component 2 pay data reporting given how quickly an 
 
329 See generally David A. Hoffman & Erik Lampmann, Hushing Contracts, 97 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 165 (2019). 
330 Ayres, supra note 325, at 79. 
331 Id.; see also Ian Ayres & Cait Unkovic, Information Escrows, 111 MICH. L. REV. 145, 
147 (2012). 
332 See Samuel Estreicher, Opinion, How to Stop the Next Harvey Weinstein, BLOOMBERG 
(Nov. 12, 2017, 10:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2017-11-12/how-
to-stop-the-next-harvey-weinstein; see also Ayres, supra note 325, at 86-87 (describing 
Estreicher’s proposal and noting that “survivors, notwithstanding any settlement or 
[nondisclosure agreement], always remain free to cooperate with an EEOC investigation”). 
333 Estreicher, supra note 332. 
334 Ayres, supra note 325, at 87. 
335 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c); 29 C.F.R. § 1602.11 (2020). 
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employer could complete it.336 The EEOC could then monitor and intervene 
using its investigatory power for repeat offenders.337  
In 2019, U.S. Representative Carolyn Maloney proposed a similar idea in the 
Ending Secrecy About Workplace Sexual Harassment Act338—the most directly 
in line with a model compelling disclosure to the EEOC. The bill would require 
every EEO-1-covered employer to include in its annual EEO-1 report “the 
number of settlements reached by the employer” that year to resolve sex 
discrimination complaints, including sexual harassment, “where anything of 
value is conferred to the individual raising the claim in return for such individual 
declining to further pursue the claim, any internal mediation or other workplace 
resolution that results in the individual declining to further pursue the claim.”339 
It would also order the EEOC to report this data, as well as data on its own 
received charges of sex discrimination and resolution of those cases, to Congress 
annually340 and would order the U.S. Comptroller General to “conduct a 
comprehensive study of claims of discrimination on the basis of sex, 
including . . . sexual harassment” and report to Congress the results of that study 
with “recommendations for legislation or other action for improving 
transparency and accountability regarding such claims.”341 
Beyond data collection, labor law scholars Sharon Block and Terri Gerstein 
have proposed requiring government agency notification or approval of any 
private settlement of sexual harassment claims.342 They suggest that a court or 
relevant antidiscrimination agency be required to sign off on such settlements, 
pointing to similar requirements for settlements under the Fair Labor Standards 
Act, which requires “court approval or review by the federal labor department,” 
and for settlements under the Class Action Fairness Act, which requires notice 
to the state attorney general or alternative.343 Requiring approval, or even notice, 
they argue, would “create a public record of settlements, giving workers access 
 
336 NYU School of Law, Avoiding the Next Harvey Weinstein: Sexual Harassment & Non-
Disclosure Agreements, YOUTUBE, at 01:01:40-:02:15 (Feb. 8, 2018), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QTw-w9gnjjM; see also Ayres, supra note 325, at 86 
(describing Estreicher’s proposal). 
337 Ayres, supra note 325, at 86-87 (describing Estreicher’s proposal). 
338 H.R. 1828, 116th Cong. § 2 (2019). 
339 Id. § 2(a)-(b). 
340 Id. § 4. 
341 Id. § 5. 
342 Sharon Block & Terri Gerstein, We Need an Agenda for New Laws to Prevent Sexual 
Harassment, GUARDIAN (Dec. 2, 2017, 10:18 AM), https://www.theguardian.com 
/commentisfree/2017/dec/02/agenda-new-laws-prevent-sexual-harassment 
[https://perma.cc/H2G2-TYDW]; Terri Gerstein, Sexual Harassment: New Laws that Would 
Help, ONLABOR (Dec. 6, 2017), https://onlabor.org/sexual-harassment-new-laws-that-would-
help/ [https://perma.cc/2PMH-TAK8]. 
343 Gerstein, supra note 342 (citation omitted); accord Block & Gerstein, supra note 342. 
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to important information and enabling the government to intervene when a clear 
pattern has emerged.”344  
Using a different reporting mechanism, securities law scholars and federal 
legislators have considered whether SEC disclosure requirements could be used 
to collect and publicize data on sexual harassment settlements. Daniel Hemel 
and Dorothy Lund have considered using corporate law structures themselves as 
a means of redressing sexual harassment, considering liability under federal 
securities law disclosure requirements and state corporate law fiduciary 
duties.345 With regard to disclosures, they review existing disclosure 
requirements, ultimately concluding that under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, Regulation S-K, and Rule 10b-5, “the argument that [they] mandate[] 
disclosure of sexual harassment claims is . . . questionable at best.”346 They also 
address the movement to encourage companies toward greater disclosure on 
ESG factors,347 noting that “[s]exual harassment policies and procedures are 
likely to be the next frontier” in this area.348  
Lastly, federal legislators have also proposed expanding the SEC’s mandate 
in both of the past two legislative sessions without success. One bill, the Sunlight 
in Workplace Harassment Act, would have SEC-covered entities “disclose 
annually on Form 10–K, to shareholders . . . and to the public . . . the total 
number of settlements entered into” in the prior year by the entity and its 
contractors, subsidiaries, or executives “that relate to any alleged act of sexual 
abuse . . . harassment, or . . . discrimination” on the basis of any protected class, 
including sex and race, as well as “the total dollar amount paid with respect to 
[such] settlements.”349 In announcing their bill, the authors stressed the need for 
exposure to motivate change, noting that requiring public disclosures would 
“lead to greater transparency . . . and a more robust discussion of how to prevent 
workplace misconduct and hold people in power accountable” and arguing that 
“the amount of money that companies spend on [discrimination] settlements” 
directly impacts the financial health of the company as an investment.350 A 
second proposal included a similar provision that would require any entity filing 
 
344 Block & Gerstein, supra note 342. 
345 See Hemel & Lund, supra note 19, at 1590-92. 
346 See id. at 1650-55. 
347 Brandon Boze, Margarita Krivitski, David F. Larcker, Brian Tayan & Eva Zlotnicka, 
The Business Case for ESG, STANFORD CLOSER LOOK SERIES, May 23, 2019, at 1, 2 (analyzing 
different approaches to incorporating ESG factors into the decision-making processes of 
corporations). 
348 See Hemel & Lund, supra note 19, at 1663-66. 
349 Sunlight in Workplace Harassment Act, S. 2454, 115th Cong. § 2 (2018). 
350 Press Release, Elizabeth Warren, Senator, U.S. Senate, Warren, Rosen Unveil 
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a Form 10-K to include the number of settlements during the reporting period 
for workplace harassment on the basis of any protected class (including sex and 
race) and for retaliation; the total amount of “any judgments or awards 
(including awards through arbitration or administrative proceedings) . . . entered 
against the [entity] . . . or any payments made in connection with a release of 
claims.”351 The disclosure would also require notice of whether there were three 
or more such settlements or judgments “that relate to a particular individual 
employed . . . without identifying that individual by name.” 352 
As these many ideas and legislative proposals demonstrate, there are many 
approaches the federal government could take to compel employers to disclose 
the existence of harassment in their ranks. Yet each varies in terms of its 
feasibility of being enacted and how well it serves the theoretical goals of 
compelled disclosure. Basic prohibitions of either nondisclosure agreements or 
arbitration of harassment claims would do a great deal to help with private, 
individual enforcement of sexual and racial harassment and discrimination 
claims. Yet their focus on transparency and secrecy achieves only so much given 
that they still rely on individual employees to speak out and to litigate publicly. 
While they increase transparency, they still rely entirely on an employee to 
overcome fear of stigma, retaliation, and loss of their own confidentiality to 
make the settlement public. Even though the employer may no longer hide 
behind confidentiality or unpublicized arbitrations, the employer bears no 
additional cost or motivation to prevent the harassment unless the employee is 
willing to risk retribution to attract publicity to the case.  
Ayres’s and Estreicher’s proposals recognize that it may be impractical or 
unwise to ban all confidential settlements (which employees may prefer) and 
rightly engage the EEOC to pick up a greater role in the enforcement burden.353 
They also allow a path for adopting a disclosure requirement administratively 
rather than hoping for any piece of legislation to pass in the current polarized 
political environment.354 Yet, in maintaining total confidentiality, neither 
reaches the full potential of the information-asymmetry-correcting, behavior-
forcing, and publicness benefits that undergird the power of compelled 
disclosures.355 This means that the EEOC—and only the EEOC, with its limited 
resources—must act to make a change. On the other hand, Block and Gerstein’s 
proposal goes further toward harnessing the power of publicness, but it may go 
too far in limiting settlement options that plaintiffs may want or need, and it 
would require amending Title VII.356  
 
351 Ending the Monopoly of Power Over Workplace Harassment Through Education and 
Reporting Act, H.R. 1521, 116th Cong. § 105(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2019). 
352 Id. § 105(c)(2). 
353 See Ayres, supra note 325, at 86-87; Estreicher, supra note 332. 
354 See Ayres, supra note 325, at 86-87; Estreicher, supra note 332. 
355 See Ayres, supra note 325, at 86-87; Estreicher, supra note 332. 
356 See Block & Gerstein, supra note 342. 
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Lastly, proposals to expand SEC disclosures are, not surprisingly, most 
aligned with the benefits of public disclosure, in that they would be public and 
identifiable and would truly compel employers to feel the economic pain of 
losing stock value due to exposure of harassment. Indeed, as Hemel and Lund 
suggest, the benefit of using securities law is that requiring public disclosures of 
sexual harassment claims and settlements would not only arm applicants and 
employees with information but “might encourage companies to do more to 
prevent workplace sexual harassment to avoid having to make such disclosures 
in the first place.”357 
Yet the SEC may not be the right entity to collect this information. First, 
disclosures to the SEC are only required of large, publicly traded companies—
at last count only about 3,600 firms358—compared to the over 60,000 entities 
(employers of 100 or more and certain federal contractors) required to file EEO-
1 reports.359 This would greatly limit the reach and effectiveness of disclosure 
requirements. More importantly, the SEC is not currently in a position to do 
anything with that information other than make it public, whereas the EEOC can 
track, investigate, issue reports, and more as part of its duty to enforce 
antidiscrimination law protections. As Hemel and Lund identify, using the 
mechanism of SEC disclosures might be criticized for diverting securities law 
from “its principal objectives [of] maximizing shareholder value, protecting 
investors, and promoting the efficient allocation of capital” (yet subject to 
rebuttal that liability for “[w]orkplace-based sexual misconduct does reduce 
shareholder value [and] harm investors”).360 Incorporating harassment 
disclosures to the SEC might be just one piece of the larger project of increasing 
SEC disclosure requirements to reach ESG issues—a move that, as discussed in 
Part IV, has garnered some criticism.361 While helpful in creating public 
exposure, the issue of harassment could get lost among a sea of priorities for 
investor audiences, rather than being the priority among disclosures to the 
EEOC. This could lead to what Hemel and Lund call the “discursive harm” of 
“[o]veremphasizing the harm to shareholders and to markets,” thus treating a 
 
357 Hemel & Lund, supra note 19, at 1666-67. 
358 Where Have All the Public Companies Gone?, supra note 70. 
359 See Agency Information Collection Activities; Notice of Submission for OMB Review, 
Final Comment Request: Revision of the Employer Information Report (EEO-1), 81 Fed. Reg. 
45,479, 45,496 (July 14, 2016). 
360 Hemel & Lund, supra note 19, at 1668, 1671. 
361 Id. at 1663-66. The topic of ESG is monumental and well beyond the scope of this 
Article. See generally, e.g., Lipton, Mixed Company, supra note 83, at 82-84 (examining ways 
that sustainability disclosures are relevant to corporate financial performance); Lipton, Not 
Everything, supra note 83, at 527-33 (analyzing the impact of prosocial corporate behavior 
on corporations). 
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discrimination problem with seriously harmed victims as mere “negative 
economic externalities.”362 
Given all of the options, the most immediately and directly implementable 
solution would likely be to require reporting to the EEOC as part of the EEO-1 
or in a standalone requirement of confidential settlements or arbitration 
decisions. At the very least, this would allow the EEOC to better track where 
entities or industries experience repeated harassment or discrimination made 
otherwise untrackable due to confidential resolutions (though if a charge is filed 
before the settlement, the EEOC should have this information already). Even 
better would be to allow the public access to such information, either upon 
request as in the Maryland state model or posted publicly with other pay data, 
should Title VII be amended to allow public disclosure. The SEC model shows 
that we are willing to require public disclosure of many things that relate to the 
profitability of a public company. If we are serious about stopping harassment, 
we should not allow entities to hide its existence from other employees or the 
public. 
IV. COUNTERARGUMENTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
This Article has made the case from both normative and theoretical 
perspectives for mandatory public disclosures on equality measures, and it has 
proposed a framework for imposing such requirements on employers under U.S. 
federal law. Yet, as has been shown by similar efforts in other countries—and 
by efforts to expand disclosure requirements under U.S. securities law—any 
such proposal will face criticism. This Part raises and responds to likely 
arguments against imposing mandatory disclosure requirements as part of 
antidiscrimination law enforcement. It addresses economic and practical 
counterarguments to requiring employers to provide equality disclosures, as well 
as constitutional concerns rooted in privacy rights and the First Amendment. 
While there are certainly challenges to consider, this Part concludes that the need 
for greater antidiscrimination law enforcement and the benefits to be gained by 
imposing the proposed disclosure requirements outweigh costs.  
A. The Case Against Disclosing Discrimination 
This Section identifies and responds to the main economic and practical 
arguments against imposing a mandatory disclosure regime on equality 
measures. Criticisms of disclosure in the securities law context, business-centric 
arguments against existing antidiscrimination law data collection, and 
 
362 Hemel & Lund, supra note 19, at 1671. That said, they also suggest that “the availability 
of alternative mechanisms for addressing problems related to workplace sexual misconduct 
does not make corporate law an irrelevant—or undesirable—tool in the fight against sexual 
harassment,” suggesting that “various tools may be complements rather than substitutes.” Id. 
at 1678. 
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scholarship on civil rights law compliance suggest three main counterarguments: 
inefficiency, manipulability, and unintended consequences.  
1. Cost/Benefit Concerns and Disclosure Overload 
The most likely practical concern with imposing new equality disclosure 
requirements on U.S. businesses is that they are inefficient: producing such 
information is costly to businesses and does not return enough benefits.363 While 
a general argument against any regulatory burden, arguments that costs 
outweigh benefits have been frequently raised in the context of securities 
disclosure requirements.364 A related concern in the securities context is 
“disclosure overload”—the idea that SEC-reporting entities are required to 
produce so much information that what is produced becomes duplicative and 
unreadable, losing its utility to investors.365 Such concerns sparked an SEC 
initiative to simplify disclosures, which resulted in a new “Disclosure Update 
and Simplification” regulatory rule, enacted in November 2018, to amend 
disclosure requirements that had “become redundant, duplicative, overlapping, 
outdated, or superseded.”366 
As applied to antidiscrimination law efforts, the Trump Administration’s 
efforts to roll back the Obama-era pay-data collection efforts center around cost. 
As described previously, the sole justification given for suspending EEO-1 
Component 2 data collection was cost.367 In 2016, the EEOC estimated a total 
cost of approximately $53.5 million for 2017 and 2018 combined; the EEOC 
under the Trump Administration recalculated to $1.23 billion ($614 million in 
2017 and $622 million in 2018).368 This increase of twenty-three times the 
original estimated cost is not only hard to rationalize but was generated only 
after a federal district court found inadequate justification for staying the 
order.369 Even using the Trump-era numbers arguendo, when divided by the 
number of filers, this is an extremely manageable cost for a company to incur to 
help play a role in redressing and preventing structural discrimination. The 
original estimates were based on 60,886 firms (employers and contractors)370—
meaning a cost of $439 per firm per year. The revised estimates were based on 
 
363 See Estlund, Just the Facts, supra note 16, at 396-99 (considering costs of disclosure). 
364 See supra Part I. 
365 SU, supra note 68, at 2. 
366 Disclosure Update and Simplification, Securities Act Release No. 10,532, Exchange 
Act Release No. 83,875, Investment Company Act Release No. 33,203, 83 Fed. Reg. 50,148, 
50,148 (Oct. 4, 2018). 
367 See Agency Information Collection Activities; Notice of Submission for OMB Review, 
Final Comment Request: Revision of the Employer Information Report (EEO–1), 81 Fed. 
Reg. 45,479, 45,484 (July 14, 2016). 
368 EEO-1 Collection Information, supra note 230. 
369 See Nat’l Women’s L. Ctr. v. Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, 358 F. Supp. 3d. 66, 90 (2019); 
Agency Information Collection Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. at 45,493. 
370 Agency Information Collection Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. at 45,494. 
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90,000 firms filing371—meaning a cost of $6,869 per firm per year. For an 
employer of 100 employees or more, even the revised number is a small amount 
of money, particularly if it leads to improvement in productivity or a reduction 
in litigation costs over the longer term.372   
Given that any creation or expansion of equality disclosures would be limited 
to specific information on pay, promotion, and harassment, there is little concern 
of disclosure overload in this context. Instead, the real question is one of costs 
and general employer concern about regulatory overload. There is no doubt that 
imposing new disclosure requirements would add costs to business operations, 
but there is a great deal of uncertainty about both how much cost and whether 
the benefits would be worth it. In particular, as the example of the Component 2 
pay-data collection shows, within seven months, nearly 90% of the at least 
60,000 entities required to report373 were able to comply.374 Most importantly, 
costs are only a problem if they are not worth the benefits. If we are truly 
committed to rooting out discrimination and harassment, relative to other 
options, this is a low cost to the government, and it places some cost on 
employers to self-police. The law contemplates that employers must prevent and 
redress discrimination. If that is true, this is a cost that should be imposed.  
 
371 Agency Information Collection Activities: Existing Collection, 84 Fed. Reg. 48,138, 
48,141 (Sept. 12, 2019). 
372 This radical change in calculation was, according to the Trump-era EEOC, because the 
Obama-era EEOC calculated “at the individual employer level . . . and not at the individual 
form level,” “relied . . . on the number of . . . ‘EEO–1 filers’ without considering the variation 
in burden attributable to the different number and types of EEO–1 reports that different 
employers file,” and failed to account for the fact that “an employer with numerous locations 
[must] file a corresponding number of EEO-1 ‘establishment’ reports.” Id. at 48,140. The 
Obama EEOC explained this choice with the explanation “that the bulk of the tasks performed 
in completing the EEO–1 report will be completed at the firm level due to the centrality of 
automation”—a rational assumption the Trump EEOC ignored. Id. (quoting Agency 
Information Collection Activities: Notice of Submission for OMB Review, Final Comment 
Request: Revision of the Employer Information Report (EEO-1), 81 Fed Reg. at 45,493). 
Regardless, it is difficult to believe that the $1.2 billion difference can be accounted for by 
the Trump EEOC’s explanation: that it “has developed a more accurate methodology that 
deconstructs the total number of reports submitted by report type and by filer type, and then 
estimates an average burden based on the number and types of reports submitted.” Id. This 
recalculation then led the Trump EEOC to conclude that “the utility of the data to its 
enforcement programs” of “Component 2 is far outweighed by the burden imposed on 
employers that must comply with the reporting obligation.” Id. at 48,141. 
373 Compare Agency Information Collection Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. at 45,494 (estimating 
in 2016 that “60,886 private industry and contractor filers” would “submit both Components 
1 and 2 starting with the 2017 reporting cycle”), with Agency Information Collection 
Activities: Existing Collection, 84 Fed. Reg. at 48,141 (“Because the number of Component 
1 filers increased to 87,021 by the close of data year 2018, the EEOC is estimating that the 
number of filers required to submit Component 1 will increase again to approximately 90,000 
for data years 2019 through 2021.”). 
374 See Lidgett, supra note 235. 
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2. Manipulability and Symbolic Compliance 
Separate from the issues of cost to employers is the risk that compelling 
disclosures may not be effective because data produced by covered entities is 
susceptible to manipulation. From the securities disclosure context, this is 
another criticism: the concern that disclosure requirements will be made less 
effective by “be[ing] so carefully calculated or cabined that they mislead by 
omission” or include “half-truths.”375  
In the context of antidiscrimination law, “symbolic compliance” has long 
been a concern of scholars who study how the legal proscriptions get translated 
into action in the workplace and how employer actions are then perceived as 
legal compliance by courts.376 For example, Frank Dobbin and Alexandra Kalev 
have conducted extensive research to document how to separate employer 
practices and policies on diversity management and harassment training that are 
effective from those that are merely window dressing.377 
While no self-policing mechanism is foolproof, there is reason to believe that 
equality disclosure requirements that require specific types of data as proposed 
can be designed in a way that limits their manipulation. All data disclosed under 
this proposal would be verifiable as objective data—simply reporting what an 
employee earns based on a W-2 statement, what their official job title is, and the 
number of settlements. While the employer will be producing the data, the range 
of information collected and the opportunities for manipulation of that 
information will be limited. The EEOC can also provide definitional data to be 
used, as it has done with EEO-1 and Component 2 data.378 Moreover, any data 
submitted to the EEOC and/or made public by the employer could be 
investigated or audited by the EEOC for compliance, creating an incentive for 
the employer to limit any manipulation it might contemplate. As proposed, pay, 
promotion, and settlement data is concrete and specific and would be submitted 
to the EEOC, leaving little room for interpretation—unlike an assessment of 
 
375 Sale, supra note 65, at 1052. 
376 See generally, e.g., FRANK DOBBIN, INVENTING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY (2009); LAUREN 
B. EDELMAN, WORKING LAW: COURTS, CORPORATIONS, AND SYMBOLIC CIVIL RIGHTS (2016). 
377 See generally, e.g., Frank Dobbin & Alexandra Kalev, Why Doesn’t Diversity Training 
Work?: The Challenge for Industry and Academia, 10 ANTHROPOLOGY NOW, Sept. 2018, at 
48 [hereinafter Dobbin & Kalev, Why Doesn’t Diversity Training Work?]; Frank Dobbin & 
Alexandra Kalev, The Promise and Peril of Sexual Harassment Programs, 116 PNAS 12,255 
(2019); Elizabeth C. Tippett, Harassment Trainings: A Content Analysis, 39 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. & LAB. L. 481 (2018). 
378 See EEO-1 Instruction Booklet, supra note 205 (categorizing employment data 
concerning sex, race, and ethnicity using ten defined occupational categories). 
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whether something is “material” before it must be disclosed such as in the 
securities context379 or creating a merely symbolic training.380 
3. Rebound Effects 
A final criticism of disclosure requirements is that the requirement to disclose 
certain information may result in unintended negative consequences that 
actually undermine intended outcomes. Here, the main concern would be related 
to harassment or discrimination settlement reporting; pay- and promotion-data 
reporting would not likely lead to any backlash, as only increasing pay or 
seniority of women or racial minorities could improve employer data. Hemel 
and Lund considered these “backfire” effects in their proposal to add sexual 
harassment reporting to SEC disclosures, raising “the risk that companies will 
respond by implementing measures designed to keep allegations from coming 
to their attention” or that, even though disclosures “are required to keep the 
victim’s name confidential . . . , the prospect of public disclosure could chill 
employee reporting.”381 Unintended consequences could arguably be more 
damaging in the context of equality disclosures to the EEOC. Because employers 
are both the subjects of complaints and the reporters of information that can 
subject them to liability or investigation to the entity that would investigate—
the EEOC, not the SEC—they may try to discourage discrimination or 
harassment complaints.  
Yet two things mitigate this concern. First, in the context of hostile work 
environment claims, since 1998, under Supreme Court decisions in Faragher v. 
City of Boca Raton382 and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,383 Title VII 
provides an affirmative defense from liability where a supervisor’s harassment 
does not result in a tangible employment action, “the employer exercised 
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing 
behavior,” and “the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of 
any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid 
harm otherwise.”384 This is a strong defense that has greatly increased 
 
379 See SU, supra note 68, at 1. 
380 See Dobbin & Kalev, Why Doesn’t Diversity Training Work?, supra note 377, at 48-49 
(describing how corporations may find training essential despite ineffectiveness because such 
trainings are “vital for fending off lawsuits”). 
381 See Hemel & Lund, supra note 19, at 1666-67 (concluding, however, that doing so 
“could render them vulnerable to a . . . claim” against directors for breach of duty of loyalty). 
They also discuss the risk of the “Mike Pence” effect—that “male employers will respond in 
ways that redound to the detriment of female employees”—but properly conclude that “[t]he 
argument that we should refrain from penalizing executives for behaving illegally because 
they might respond by behaving illegally is . . . a weak one.” Id. at 1674-75. I agree. 
382 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
383 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
384 Id. at 765. 
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employers’ creation and encouragement of employee reporting, even though it 
has been subject to criticism for shielding employers from liability.385  
Second, these risks arise only when the employee reports internally and never 
to the EEOC, which an employee must also do to pursue any claim or lawsuit 
under Title VII.386 The employer cannot stop an employee from complaining to 
the EEOC, so the charge would be recorded regardless; there is no additional 
benefit in deterring an employee from pursuing a claim that is arbitrated or 
settled to hide its existence from the EEOC once the EEOC knows about the 
charge. If the employee felt deterred from complaining internally, they could 
still complain only to the EEOC and argue that their failure to report internally 
was not unreasonable given employer pressure, thus limiting the employer’s 
Faragher/Ellerth defense. And employees need not report any claim of 
discrimination other than harassment internally. 
As for the chilling effect of fear that confidential reporting would be made 
public, in reality, the far greater deterrent to any employee is fear of retaliation 
at work. If they can get past that fear, repeated assurances that the accuser’s 
identifying data would be kept confidential may suffice. Nevertheless, the 
interaction of disclosure requirements with internal reporting systems poses a 
potential concern that the EEOC will need to track.387 
B. Privacy Concerns 
Because this Article is proposing that, to the extent possible, disclosure 
information should be reported publicly, critics may also raise concerns about 
infringing on the privacy of employers and possibly their employees.388 
 
385 See, e.g., Elizabeth C. Potter, Note, When Women’s Silence Is Reasonable: Reforming 
the Faragher/Ellerth Defense in the #MeToo Era, 85 BROOK. L. REV. 603, 605 (2020) 
(criticizing how courts have interpreted the defense because it “allows employers to easily 
escape liability in cases where victims have been silent”). 
386 See supra Section I.A (describing how Title VII requires administrative exhaustion). 
387 See Hemel & Lund, supra note 19, at 1675 (“This is not to dismiss the backfire concern 
out of hand; it is to say that the benefits of increased legal protection almost certainly outweigh 
the costs.”). 
388 A separate issue that may arise around collection of the data by employers is the 
concern of employee privacy in having to identify gender or race. Given that the EEOC 
already collects EEO-1 data, existing procedures should govern. The United Kingdom 
considered and issued best practices for how to handle nonbinary gender classification. See 
ADVISORY, CONCILIATION & ARB. SERV., MANAGING GENDER PAY REPORTING 9 (2019), 
https://archive.acas.org.uk/media/4764/Managing-gender-pay-reporting/pdf/Managing 
_gender_pay_reporting_07.02.19.pdf [https://perma.cc/448E-D8V2] (“It is important for 
employers to be sensitive to how an employee chooses to self-identify in terms of their gender. 
The regulations do not define the terms ‘male’ and ‘female’ and the requirement to report 
gender pay should not result in employees being singled out and questioned about their 
gender. . . . [M]ost employers should be able to base reports on the gender identification the 
employee has provided for HR . . . . [E]mployers should establish a method which enables all 
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Requiring employers to provide anonymized demographic and salary 
information on employees to the EEOC falls well short of raising any Fourth 
Amendment concerns around search and seizure.389 But, as described 
previously, under Title VII and the EEOC’s current EEO-1-data-collection 
program, the government is required to keep collected data confidential.390 
Given existing practices, employers are likely to resist greater collection and 
exposure of data on equality measures, fearing negative repercussions of 
unflattering data. One option that could alleviate employers’ privacy concerns is 
to expand EEO-1 data collection to provide the additional Component 2 pay 
data, data on leadership, and data on harassment settlements only to the EEOC 
in the same confidential manner as currently exists. Even this may be met with 
resistance by some employers. Jamillah Bowman Williams has documented the 
recent trend of technology companies seeking exemptions to FOIA requests for 
existing EEO-1 data by claiming that workforce diversity matters are protected 
trade secrets.391 Yet no court has held that raw data on workforce demographics 
should be subject to such protections (as opposed to companies’ “strategies” or 
“initiatives” around improving diversity).392 Thus, expanding EEO-1 data 
collection under existing confidentiality practices should pose no new privacy 
problem for employers.   
A more useful disclosure regime, however, would include some publication—
whether aggregated or identified only by industry, or, even more effective, 
employer identified like the European model.393 Should more employer-
 
employees to confirm or update their gender. . . . In cases where the employee does not self-
identify as either gender, an employer may omit the individual from the calculations.”). 
389 There is neither a reasonable expectation of privacy in this information by the employee 
nor an unreasonable search or intrusion by the government requesting it from the employer. 
See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“This Court has held repeatedly that 
the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party 
and conveyed by [the third party] to Government authorities, even if the information is 
revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence 
placed in the third party will not be betrayed.”). 
390 See 42 U.S.C § 2000e-8(e); EEO-1 Instruction Booklet, supra note 205. Following the 
EEOC and Title VII model, state laws or proposals to collect pay data in New York and 
California and the collection of sexual-harassment-settlement data in Maryland and Illinois 
all also require and ensure confidentiality of reported data to the state fair employment 
practices agency only. See 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-108 (2020); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & 
EMPL. § 3-715 (West 2020); S.B. 171, 2019-2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019); S.B. S4065, 
2019-2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019). 
391 See Williams, supra note 17, at 1693-96. 
392 See id. at 1707 (explaining how trade secret caselaw “suggests that diversity strategies 
and data may deserve differing treatment”); see also Estlund, Just the Facts, supra note 16, 
at 391-94 (considering employers’ arguments that disclosures contain “proprietary 
information”); Estlund, Extending the Case, supra note 16, at 792-93 (same with regard to 
pay-data disclosures). 
393 As discussed, this would require a change to Title VII. See supra notes 252-59 and 
accompanying text. 
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identifying information be made public, on some level, the response to 
concerned employers should be “too bad.” When compared to data collection in 
Europe, or even in the United States as required by the SEC, the mandate to the 
EEOC to protect the privacy of employers seems both unnecessary and 
misguided. Congress passed Title VII, employers are mandated to comply, and 
improvement in workplace equality is still stalled. If employers are hesitant to 
share their information publicly, that is the point—that is the power of improving 
compliance through disclosure. Ironically, the European disclosure laws rely on 
the power of publicity, despite the fact that the EU has much stronger data 
privacy protections than the United States.394 Title VII enforcement has long 
been hampered by a strong jurisprudential deference to employers.395 It is worth 
questioning why the EEOC continues to keep compliance data confidential 
when discrimination persists six decades after Title VII was enacted. 
On the employee side, the EEOC could and should continue to ensure that 
individual identifying information about employees is protected.396 If employer 
data were published, it would be in the aggregate, with no employee names 
attached. Moreover, all covered entities would have at least 100 employees, so 
it is unlikely that the data would be granular enough to impact the privacy of any 
individual employee. If employee privacy still remained a concern, the EEOC 
could publish analyses of pay- and promotion-gap data only, as in the U.K. 
model, rather than publishing raw data by salary bands. While employee privacy 
concerns should not be taken lightly, an equality-disclosure-reporting regime as 
envisioned in this Article would not risk exposure of any individual employee 
information.  
C. First Amendment Concerns 
Lastly, because an equality-disclosure requirement would compel private 
businesses to produce information to a governmental agency, critics may argue 
that it constitutes compelled speech in violation of the First Amendment. Lower 
courts have considered related issues, but whether compelling public disclosures 
could violate the free speech rights of employer entities has yet to be directly 
 
394 See Editorial Board, Opinion, Where Is America’s Privacy Law?, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 
2019, at SR10 (describing the European Union’s 2018 General Data Protection Regulation, 
which “establishes several privacy rights that do not exist in the United States”); EUR. 
PARLIAMENT DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POL’YS, A COMPARISON BETWEEN US 
AND EU DATA PROTECTION LEGISLATION FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 67 (2015), 
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395 See, e.g., Edelman et al., supra note 166, at 888 (documenting judicial deference to 
“formal organizational policies prohibiting discrimination or guaranteeing fair treatment” as 
evidence of nondiscrimination). 
396 See Estlund, Extending the Case, supra note 16, at 797-98 (considering employee 
privacy concerns raised by pay-data disclosures). 
 
356 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101:287 
 
addressed by the Supreme Court.397 A complete analysis of this topic, on which 
there is a robust and significant body of scholarship,398 is well beyond the scope 
of this Article. Yet the few commentators to consider the issue in the context of 
antidiscrimination law provide some guidance.399  
Broadly speaking, only certain types of speech are protected against 
government interference by the First Amendment. Regulation of unprotected 
speech must be reasonable to serve a governmental interest under rational basis 
review; regulation of protected speech, however, must be narrowly tailored to 
serve a substantial government interest under strict scrutiny.400 Helen Norton 
suggests that information-forcing mechanisms like pay transparency rules 
intended to support enforcement of antidiscrimination law should fall outside 
the First Amendment as unprotected “commercial speech.”401 Where the Court 
has extended First Amendment protection to some commercial speech, it has 
done so to protect consumers; because “the Court has applied only deferential 
review to laws requiring commercial speakers to make accurate disclosures to 
their listeners,” she suggests, “antidiscrimination laws . . . that require truthful 
disclosures by commercial actors will generally survive this review.”402 Even if 
such disclosures were considered protected speech, Norton argues, they should 
survive strict scrutiny: truthful disclosures on employment rights and conditions 
“provide considerable value to workers as listeners while imposing little, if any, 
expressive costs” on employers.403 Moreover, enforcing antidiscrimination law 
 
397 Aronson, supra note 19, at 1212. 
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L. REV. 867 (2015); Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133; Cass R. 
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557, 566 (1980), with Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns., 471 U.S. 626, 650 (1985); see 
also Post, supra note 402, at 881-900 (comparing the two cases). 
401 Norton, Discrimination, supra note 398, at 234-38, 245-46, 248-51. 
402 Id. at 249-51; see also Post, supra note 402, at 901-907 (discussing caselaw supporting 
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‘uncontroversial’ information” and “that close constitutional scrutiny will apply to 
government efforts to compel entities to disseminate ideas or opinions [rather than facts], even 
within the medium of commercial speech”). 
403 Norton, Discrimination, supra note 398, at 250. 
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and eliminating protected class discrimination has long been held to be a 
compelling government interest.404 
In the context of sexual harassment complaints, Elizabeth Aronson 
acknowledges that compelled disclosures may not fit well within current 
understandings of “commercial speech” but argues that they still do not 
necessarily implicate any heightened level of scrutiny.405 Regardless of whether 
compelled disclosures qualify as commercial or noncommercial speech, 
Aronson suggests, they provide more information to the public and thus further 
First Amendment interests.406 That said, Aronson notes that courts could 
“consider . . . explicitly adopting a regulatory exception for such disclosures” to 
best serve First Amendment values and create clarity in the law.407 
Perhaps the strongest response to concerns about equality disclosures 
infringing on employer speech is that the EEOC has been successfully collecting 
EEO-1 data without challenge or great disruption to employer speech interests 
since just after Title VII’s enactment. Of course, this does prevent such a 
challenge in the future, particularly if the EEOC requires additional data on pay, 
promotion, or harassment settlements. Yet under existing doctrine, any rule 
merely expanding factual information collected from employers could likely be 
drafted without implicating the First Amendment.408 
CONCLUSION 
Since Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the U.S. government has 
relied on workers to recognize, raise, and pursue claims of discrimination and 
harassment, despite the serious risk of retaliation for doing so. In passing Title 
VII, Congress created the EEOC to help investigate and litigate such claims, but 
the bulk of its limited resources are spent processing charges and giving 
employees permission to hire private lawyers to litigate claims themselves. Due 
to resource constraints, the EEOC pursues only a small fraction of litigation each 
year relative to the number of private employee suits. The law prohibits 
retaliation for complaining of discrimination, but that does not stop employers 
from retaliating; the only redress an employee has for retaliation is to add a 
retaliation claim to the discrimination claim they are already pursuing.  
Relying so heavily on private employee suits leads to underreporting of 
discrimination and harassment and to underenforcement even if complaints are 
reported. While this has long been a problem with the enforcement mechanism 
of Title VII, the most recent decade of Supreme Court precedent on mandatory 
arbitration and class action certification stands to worsen the situation by forcing 
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employees out of the courts and into private arbitration, where they may be 
barred from pursuing any claim on a class-wide basis. This means that, not only 
is it difficult to hold employers accountable for discriminatory treatment, but 
when employees are willing to take the risk to raise and pursue them, their claims 
are isolated and hidden away in secret proceedings. This perfect storm of 
underreporting, underenforcement, and the invisibility of enforcement means 
that an employer who violates the law may carry on as they always have with 
impunity, while systemic recurring problems of harassment and discrimination 
remain unaddressed.  
This need not and should not be the case. Even without radically increasing 
the resources and capacity of the EEOC for public enforcement, the EEOC can 
place additional regulatory requirements on employers to produce information 
that can document the scope of the problem, assist existing enforcement efforts, 
and motivate employers to reduce inequality by self-policing. Looking to 
examples of disclosure requirements in securities law and to models for equality 
measures in other countries’ and some U.S. state law provides a path forward.  
As proposed, a disclosure regime in which employers are compelled to 
publicly produce basic information on pay, promotion, and harassment 
settlements by race and gender is a reasonable and necessary way to fulfill the 
promise of Title VII. Employers can and should be required to track and redress 
inequality and harassment fostered in their own institutions—without an 
employee having to risk personal peril by bringing a lawsuit to make them do 
so. 
 
